Methodology — Source Protection
Last updated: October 21, 2026
People who give journalists documents about government or corporate misconduct can lose their jobs, their clearances or their freedom. Protecting them starts before the first message, with an honest look at who might try to identify them and how. This page sets out the minimum Citizen Analyst expects, and the point at which a source should be sent to an organization better equipped to protect them.
1. Threat model basics
Consider device, network, legal, and social threats. Most users overestimate tech and underestimate legal compulsion.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Surveillance Self-Defense guide builds a security plan from five questions: What do I want to protect? Who do I want to protect it from? How bad are the consequences if I fail? How likely is it that I will need to protect it? How much trouble am I willing to go through to prevent those consequences? EFF’s examples of possible adversaries include “your boss”, law enforcement, a government and a former partner. For a source inside a government agency or a company, the employer belongs on that list.
2. Minimum practices
- Separate work and sensitive devices where possible.
- Metadata strip before any upload.
- Prefer Signal with disappearing messages only as hygiene — not as sole protection.
Signal says the same about its own feature. Disappearing messages keep a conversation history tidy and limit what stays on a device that is lost or seized. They are “not for situations where your contact is your adversary”: anyone receiving a message can photograph the screen before it disappears.
3. Org vs. individual
Whistleblower platforms (SecureDrop) exist for organizations with trained reviewers. Individuals should seek trusted orgs rather than DIY .onion sites.
SecureDrop is an open-source whistleblower submission system that news organizations install to receive documents and tips anonymously. Its project page says more than 60 news organizations use it, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, ProPublica and The Intercept. The server is owned by and sits inside the news organization, it does not log a source’s IP address, browser or computer, and it encrypts data in transit and at rest. Running it takes dedicated hardware and a trained administrator, which is why it is an organizational tool.
4. Publication impact
Discuss retaliation risk with source before publication; plan referrals (legal, counseling).
5. Patriot limits
Patriot chat is not a classified channel — never instruct users to paste classified or actively stolen material.
Related skills
secure-source-communication
Sources
- EFF Surveillance Self-Defense, Your Security Plan (read 2026-10-21)
- Signal, Disappearing messages (Signal blog) (read 2026-10-21)
- Freedom of the Press Foundation, SecureDrop overview (read 2026-10-21)
Expanded with AI research and drafting assistance from the primary sources cited; editorial review pending.
