The FAA ended Trump’s first term with fewer certified controllers
Last updated: November 17, 2026
Part 1 of 3 in the series on the Federal Aviation Administration across three administrations. Part 2 covers 2021 to 2025; Part 3 covers 2025 to the present.
The Brief
Donald Trump’s first term ran from January 2017 to January 2021. During the term, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lost certified air traffic controllers. There were 10,619 in September 2016 and 10,268 in September 2020.
The agency had no confirmed leader for 19 months. Two Boeing 737 MAX crashes abroad killed 346 people. The FAA grounded the jet in March 2019, after most other countries did, and cleared it in November 2020.
Congress passed a five-year FAA law in 2018 and a law to tighten aircraft approval in 2020. US airline and cargo operations had three fatal accidents from 2017 to 2020, with five deaths.
Why It Matters
The FAA runs the air traffic system every US flight uses, and it decides which new airliners are safe to fly. Both jobs take years of hiring, building and funding, so each president inherits much of what the FAA does. Three of today’s fights start here: fewer fully trained controllers, the 737 MAX crashes, and who should run air traffic control. This series scores each president on the same eight tests, so readers can judge from the record whether the FAA ended a term better or worse off than it began.
The Facts
Dollar figures are nominal (not adjusted for inflation) unless labelled “FY2026 dollars, CPI-U”. Following the series scorecard, the term’s start-year is FY2016, the last full fiscal year before it took office, and its end-year is FY2020, its last full fiscal year in office. FY means the federal fiscal year, which ends September 30. A CPC is a certified professional controller, fully qualified to work every position at a facility; a CPC-IT is a CPC in training at a new facility; a developmental is a trainee not yet certified anywhere. Bracketed numbers point to the numbered list under Evidence Trail.
The FAA on day one (January 20, 2017)
Leadership.
- Michael Huerta, an Obama appointee serving a five-year term that began in January 2013, was Administrator. [S1]
- Teri Bristol was Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), the FAA’s air traffic arm, a post she held from 2014-06-01 to 2022-02-28. [S38]
- Elaine Chao became Secretary of Transportation on 2017-01-31. [S1]
Authorization and funding.
- The FAA was operating under the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190, signed 2016-07-15), a stopgap that ran through 2017-09-30. [S1] [S28]
- FY2017 began on continuing resolutions (stopgap funding at the prior year’s rate). The full-year FY2017 appropriation, P.L. 115-31, was enacted 2017-05-05: $16.41 billion across the FAA’s four accounts, including $2.855 billion for Facilities and Equipment (F&E), the capital account that buys air traffic systems. [S18]
- FY2016 enacted funding was $16.28 billion. [S18]
Controllers.
- At the end of FY2016 (September 2016), the FAA had 14,050 controllers on board at its facilities: 10,619 CPCs, 1,259 CPC-ITs and 2,172 developmentals. Another figure, 14,449, counts Academy students as well. [S7] [S3]
- The FAA hired 1,680 controllers in FY2016 against a plan of 1,619 and ended the year “more than 250 controllers above” its headcount plan. [S3]
- The DOT Inspector General (OIG) told the House aviation subcommittee on 2016-06-15 that there were “about 14,000 controllers”, “nearly 10 percent fewer than in 2009”, and that the FAA “continues to fall short of its overall hiring goals”. [S2]
- GAO puts FY2013 to FY2015 hiring at about 1,200 below plan and ties the misses to the 2013 sequester (automatic spending cuts) and hiring freeze; the FAA’s own figure is 1,362. [S8]
- An OIG audit of 2016-01-11 had found the FAA’s most critical facilities faced a potential shortage of CPCs. [S2]
- 2,915 on-board controllers were eligible to retire in September 2016. [S7]
Modernization.
- NextGen is the FAA’s program to move air traffic control from ground radar and voice to satellite tracking and digital messaging. GAO reported on 2016-11-17 that Congress had provided about $7.4 billion for it from FY2004 to FY2016, and that the FAA’s 2016 business case put the agency’s NextGen cost at $20.6 billion through 2030, plus $15.1 billion for industry. [S10]
- Data Comm (text messaging between controllers and pilots) had reached all 55 planned tower sites in 2016. [S79]
- The Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM) contract had begun on 2016-06-30; Lockheed Martin announced it as a $344 million award on 2016-07-07. The OIG later named Leidos as prime. [S12] [S81]
- Only 651 of about 7,000 commercial aircraft (about 9 percent) carried rule-compliant ADS-B Out equipment as of August 2016, against a January 2020 deadline. [S15]
Safety and performance.
- No US airline passenger had died in an airline accident since Colgan Air 3407 on 2009-02-12. [S48]
- The NTSB counted 31 Part 121 (scheduled airline and large cargo) accidents in calendar 2016, with no fatal accidents and no deaths. [S57]
- The FAA counted 1,561 runway incursions (an aircraft, vehicle or person wrongly on a runway) in FY2016. Its rate of the most serious incursions (Categories A and B) was 0.380 per million operations, under a 0.395 target. [S59] [S61]
- The 12 airlines that report to the Department of Transportation (DOT) posted an 81.4 percent on-time arrival rate in 2016 and cancelled 1.17 percent of scheduled domestic flights, “the lowest in the 22 years with comparable numbers”. [S65]
Leadership and management
| Post | Who | Dates | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrator (Senate-confirmed) | Michael Huerta | Term began Jan 2013; ended 2018-01-07 | [S1] |
| Deputy Administrator | Daniel Elwell | Announced 2017-06-28 | [S1] |
| Acting Administrator | Daniel Elwell | 2018-01-07 to 2019-08-12 (582 days, about 19 months, computed) | [S1] |
| Administrator (Senate-confirmed) | Stephen Dickson | Sworn in 2019-08-12; in office at term end | [S1] [S41] |
| ATO Chief Operating Officer | Teri Bristol | 2014-06-01 to 2022-02-28 | [S38] |
| Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety | Ali Bahrami | Listed in FY2018 | [S38] |
| Secretary of Transportation | Elaine Chao | 2017-01-31 to 2021-01-11 (resigned; announced 2021-01-07) | [S1] [S88] |
- Huerta’s departure. Huerta’s five-year term ended on 2018-01-07, and Deputy Administrator Elwell became acting Administrator. [S1]
- Elwell’s background. Elwell had been the FAA’s assistant administrator for policy, planning and environment from 2006 to 2008. [S1]
- Dickson’s nomination. Stephen Dickson, a retired Delta Air Lines senior vice president of flight operations, had his Senate Commerce nomination hearing on 2019-05-15. [S36] [S1]
- The confirmation fight. Politico reported that the nomination “became embroiled in allegations that he may have been involved in retaliation against a Delta whistleblower”. [S35] The claim was a Delta pilot’s case against the airline, not against Dickson. In written answers to the committee he said: “No, I have never been accused of retaliation of any sort during my tenure at Delta Air Lines, including in the case referenced above”. He said he had not disclosed the case because he read the questionnaire as covering “any instance in which I was a named party to a proceeding”. [S36]
- The votes. The Senate invoked cloture (ended debate) 52 to 45, a party-line vote, on 2019-07-23, and confirmed him on 2019-07-24. [S33] [S34]
- The swearing-in. Chao swore in Dickson as the FAA’s 18th Administrator on 2019-08-12. [S1]
- Elwell’s acting tenure. Rep. Sam Graves, then the House Transportation Committee’s ranking Republican, praised Elwell for “stalwart leadership and professionalism during very difficult circumstances” as acting Administrator. [S37]
- Confirmed versus acting time. Across the 1,461 days of the term, a Senate-confirmed Administrator was in office for 879 days and an acting Administrator for 582, or 39.8 percent of the term (computed from the dates above, counting each Administrator from his swearing-in).
- Reorganizations. The FAA restructured its Aircraft Certification Service into five functional divisions on 2017-07-23. Dickson approved a reorganization of the commercial space office on 2019-12-02. [S1]
Stated priorities
Air traffic control privatization.
- The announcement. On 2017-06-05 President Trump announced a plan to separate air traffic control from the FAA into a non-profit, self-financing organization. [S1]
- The board. NPR described the proposed corporation’s board as “made up mostly of representatives of the major airlines”. It reported that the controllers’ union was “generally supportive”. [S25]
- In the FAA’s own plan. The FAA’s 2017 workforce plan stated: “The Administration proposes to shift FAA’s air traffic control function to a non-governmental, non-profit organization in 2021.” [S3]
- The bill. Chairman Bill Shuster introduced the 21st Century AIRR Act (H.R. 2997) on 2017-06-22. The House Transportation and Infrastructure (T&I) Committee ordered it reported 32 to 25 on 2017-06-27. It never received a floor vote. [S23]
- The opponents. Committee Democrats said the bill “allows a private corporate board, dominated by the major airlines, to run the system and charge the flying public for service”. This is a minority-party characterization, reported here as a claim. [S26]
- The end of the push. On 2018-02-27 Shuster dropped the effort. He said the provisions “did not reach the obvious level of support needed to pass Congress” and that “some of my own colleagues refused to support shrinking the federal government by 35,000 employees”. USA Today noted that Trump had endorsed privatization in both budgets he had submitted, and that the Senate bill left it out. [S24]
Drones.
- On 2017-10-25 the President directed a UAS (drone) Integration Pilot Program with state, local and tribal governments; DOT selected 10 participants on 2018-05-09. [S1]
- On 2020-12-28 the FAA announced final rules requiring remote identification of drones and allowing small drones to fly over people and at night under conditions. It cited 1.7 million drone registrations and 203,000 certificated remote pilots. The rules were published in the Federal Register on 2021-01-15. [S77]
Other actions.
- The BasicMed rule took effect on 2017-05-01, giving general-aviation pilots an alternative to the third-class medical certificate. [S1]
- Dickson told senators at his nomination hearing: “I’ll be the captain of the ship, I’ll be a steady hand on the tiller … that doesn’t mean that I’m not going to be asking the tough questions and making the changes that need to be made.” [S36]
- No source in this run ties a deregulatory executive order to a specific FAA action.
Budget requests and appropriations
The request column is the President’s budget for the FAA’s four accounts (Operations, F&E, Research, Engineering and Development, and the Airport Improvement Program obligation limit). The enacted column adds the General Fund airport-grant supplements Congress added from FY2018. Both are from the FAA’s own ten-year tables; totals are computed. [S18] Real figures multiply the nominal amount by the BLS CPI-U fiscal-year deflator and are expressed in FY2026 dollars. [S89] CPI-U, a consumer-price index, is the deflator this series uses for consistency; the GDP price index is the usual alternative for federal spending.
| FY | Request released | Request ($M, nominal) | Enacted (date, law) | Enacted ($M, nominal) | Enacted ($M, FY2026 dollars, CPI-U) | Enacted minus request ($M, nominal, computed) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 (start-year) | [release date not sourced] (Obama) | 15,836.0 | 2015-12-18, P.L. 114-113 | 16,280.7 | 22,537.4 | +444.7 |
| 2017 | 2016-02-09 (Obama) [S21] | 15,899.9 | 2017-05-05, P.L. 115-31 | 16,407.4 | 22,256.6 | +507.5 |
| 2018 | Overview 2017-03-16; full 2017-05-23 [S20] | 16,157.1 | 2018-03-23, P.L. 115-141 | 18,000.7 | 23,840.1 | +1,843.6 |
| 2019 | 2018-02-12 [S21] | 16,122.3 | 2019-02-15, P.L. 116-6 | 17,451.9 | 22,692.7 | +1,329.6 |
| 2020 (end-year) | Release 2019-03-11; details 2019-03-18 [S22] [S21] | 17,105.0 | 2019-12-20, P.L. 116-94 | 17,617.7 | 22,584.1 | +512.7 |
| 2021 | 2020-02-10 [S21] | 17,521.5 | 2020-12-27, P.L. 116-260 | 17,964.5 | 22,286.8 | +443.0 |
| FY | F&E requested ($M, nominal) | F&E enacted ($M, nominal) | F&E enacted ($M, FY2026 dollars, CPI-U) | RE&D requested ($M, nominal) | RE&D enacted ($M, nominal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2,855.0 | 2,855.0 | 3,952.2 | 166.0 | 166.0 |
| 2017 | 2,838.0 | 2,855.0 | 3,872.8 | 167.5 | 176.5 |
| 2018 | 2,766.2 | 3,250.0 | 4,304.3 | 150.0 | 188.9 |
| 2019 | 2,766.6 | 3,000.0 | 3,900.9 | 74.4 | 191.1 |
| 2020 | 3,295.0 | 3,045.0 | 3,903.4 | 120.0 | 192.7 |
| 2021 | 3,000.0 | 3,015.0 | 3,740.4 | 170.0 | 198.0 |
What Congress enacted.
- Congress enacted more than the President requested in every year of the term. The FY2018 gap includes $1.0 billion of General Fund airport grants the request did not seek. [S18]
- The FY2019 request was about 10 percent below FY2018 enacted funding, mostly because it did not repeat that supplement and reduced F&E and research. CRS shows the House and Senate bills at $17.7 billion before final action. [S19]
- The FY2019 request for research ($74.4 million) was the lowest in the FAA’s ten-year table. [S18]
Change over the term. All changes below are computed from the tables, start-year FY2016 to end-year FY2020.
| Account | Nominal change | Real change (FY2026 dollars, CPI-U) |
|---|---|---|
| Enacted total | +8.2% ($16.28B to $17.62B) | +0.2% ($22.54B to $22.58B) |
| F&E | +6.7% ($2.855B to $3.045B) | -1.2% ($3.95B to $3.90B) |
| Operations | +7.3% ($9.91B to $10.63B) | -0.7% ($13.72B to $13.63B) |
- Real F&E peaked in FY2018 at $4.30 billion (FY2026 dollars, CPI-U), the year Congress added $395 million in nominal terms over FY2017.
- A 2025 DOT planning paper says F&E stayed “essentially flat at approximately $3 billion per year” for 15 years and lost about $1 billion in purchasing power. That is the agency’s own description, not an audit. [S68]
Emergency money.
- The CARES Act (P.L. 116-136, 2020-03-27) gave airports $10 billion from the General Fund. The December 2020 relief law in P.L. 116-260 added $2 billion. [S18] [S1]
- The CARES Act also suspended aviation excise taxes. That cut the Airport and Airway Trust Fund’s share of FAA funding in FY2020 to 62 percent. Total FY2020 budgetary resources were $55.8 billion. [S63]
Authorization.
| Law | Signed | Extended FAA programs to | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| P.L. 115-63 | 2017-09-29 | 2018-03-31 | [S32] |
| P.L. 115-141, Div. M | 2018-03-23 | 2018-09-30 | [S31] |
| P.L. 115-250 | 2018-09-29 | 2018-10-07 | [S30] |
| P.L. 115-254, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 | 2018-10-05 | FY2018 to FY2023 | [S27] |
- No lapse in the FAA’s authorization occurred between 2015 and 2018; every expiry was bridged by an extension. [S29]
- The 2018 Act authorized $17.1 billion for FY2018, rising to $19.9 billion for FY2023. [S28]
- The FAA’s chronology calls it “one of the longest reauthorization periods for the agency since the 1980s”. [S1]
Shutdown.
- Appropriations for DOT lapsed from 2018-12-22 (the gap began at midnight on 2018-12-21) to 2019-01-25. GAO and the FAA count 35 days; CRS counts 34. [S8] [S29] [S1]
- Controllers worked without pay. [S1]
Modernization: programs, contracts, progress
NextGen overall.
- GAO-17-450 (2017-08-31) found NextGen surface tools at 39 of the 40 busiest airports. It found the FAA’s cost estimates “within range” of 2007’s, and that the FAA had implemented most of GAO’s earlier recommendations. [S9]
- It named the remaining risks: uncertain funding, aircraft equipage, a possible restructuring of air traffic control, FAA leadership stability and cybersecurity. [S9]
- The FAA’s 2018 estimate put its own NextGen cost at about $22 billion by 2030. [S11]
- GAO later found the FAA had not updated NextGen life-cycle cost estimates since 2017. [S11]
- CRS describes NextGen funding as “almost $1 billion annually, primarily derived from FAA’s F&E account”. [S84]
- The OIG estimates Congress appropriated “roughly $13 billion” for NextGen from 2004 to 2021, across all accounts. [S14] That figure and GAO’s $7.4 billion through FY2016 use different bases and should not be subtracted.
ADS-B (satellite-based aircraft tracking).
- Acting Administrator Elwell signed an agreement with the Defense Department on ADS-B Out on 2018-06-26. [S1]
- The FAA relaunched a $500 equipment rebate on 2018-10-12; the program ended 2019-10-11 after 20,000 rebates. [S1]
- The FAA announced its ADS-B baseline services rollout complete on 2019-10-07. [S1]
- Equipage rose from about 9 percent of commercial aircraft in August 2016 [S15]. By the OIG’s 2019-09-12 count, “76 percent of commercial operators have equipped their aircraft”, against 44 percent of general aviation operators. The two counts may not use the same base. [S16]
- The OIG found in December 2019 that most commercial operators planned to meet the deadline, but that the FAA “has not finalized procedures needed by non-equipped operators to access” ADS-B airspace. [S17]
- The mandate took effect on 2020-01-01. [S16] This run did not find the share of aircraft equipped on that date.
Data Comm.
- The FAA reported in April 2019 that tower service was operational at all 55 sites “29 months ahead of schedule and under budget”. The same briefing said the en route deployment was being re-planned “following the government shutdown”. [S78]
- En route service began in 2019, with the Kansas City and Indianapolis centers fully operational by late 2019, by the FAA’s account. [S79]
- The OIG found in 2025 that Data Comm absorbed a 51-month (67 percent) delay and a $41 million (5 percent) cost increase from COVID-19, plus $7 million from government shutdowns. [S13]
- The FAA’s FY2027 capital plan lists full en route Data Comm with an original December 2023 completion now moved to July 2027, a 43-month delay. [S18]
- The two measures differ: the OIG figure is cost and delay it attributes to outside events, while the capital plan measures change against the program’s original baseline. Both were reported in 2025-2026, and neither source says when the schedule was re-baselined, so the scorecard does not count the slip against this term (series rule D7c).
Other programs.
- TFDM. The OIG found in 2024 that TFDM deployment ran nearly three years late, and that a roughly 20 percent cost increase since its 2016 baseline cut planned sites from 89 to 49. It attributes $12 million of the growth to the 2019 shutdown. [S12] [S13] The sources do not date TFDM’s re-baselining, so it is a cross-term fact here, not a mark against this term (rule D7c).
- NAS Voice System. The OIG published a report titled “Changes in Requirements and Schedule Delays Contributed to the Termination of the NAS Voice System Contract” on 2022-01-12. [S83] A later OIG report says the FAA expected to pay $274 million to sustain legacy voice systems through 2030 after cancelling that contract. [S14] The termination date was not established from a primary source in this research, so it is not counted in the scorecard.
- Major system investments. This is the FAA’s own measure of the share of baselined programs within 10 percent of cost and schedule targets, against a 90 percent goal. It ran 95 percent (FY2016), 95 percent (FY2017), 90.5 percent (FY2018), 75 percent (FY2019, missed) and 65 percent (FY2020, missed). [S61] [S62] [S63]
Contracts in or bearing on the term. Obligations to date were not retrieved: the USAspending award search returned errors in this research run.
| Program | Award or action | Vendor | Value as reported | Era | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Data Comm integrated services (DCIS) | 2012-09 | Harris (now L3Harris) | $331M, 7 years | Inherited | [S87] |
| TFDM | Contract start 2016-06-30 | Lockheed Martin announced; OIG names Leidos as prime | $344M announced; program “almost $1 billion” (OIG) | Inherited | [S81] [S12] |
| ADS-B rebate | Relaunched 2018-10-12 | Aircraft owners | $4.9M for 9,792 installations; 20,000 rebates in all | In term | [S1] |
| STARS and ERAM follow-on | 2019 notice of intent | Raytheon (STARS) | Estimated $1.0B ten-year single-source contract (STARS) | In term | [S80] |
| Enterprise Information Display System (E-IDS) | 2020-08-25 | Leidos | Not captured | In term | [S1] |
Staffing
Controllers at FAA facilities at the end of each fiscal year (September), from the FAA Finance staffing snapshot, which excludes FAA Academy students. [S7]
| FY | On board | CPCs | CPC-ITs | Developmentals | Trainees (CPC-IT + developmentals, computed) | Retirement-eligible | Hires (plan) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 14,050 | 10,619 | 1,259 | 2,172 | 3,431 | 2,915 | 1,680 (1,619) |
| 2017 | 14,009 | 10,544 | 1,205 | 2,260 | 3,465 | 2,410 | 1,880 (1,781) |
| 2018 | 14,285 | 10,483 | 1,320 | 2,482 | 3,802 | 1,842 | 1,786 (1,701) |
| 2019 | 14,193 | 10,419 | 1,414 | 2,360 | 3,774 | 1,004 | 1,010 (1,431, cut to 907) |
| 2020 | 13,830 | 10,268 | 1,309 | 2,253 | 3,562 | 1,143 | 920 (910) |
Targets.
- The FAA publishes a staffing range for CPCs plus CPC-ITs and says it manages toward the middle of that range. [S4]
- In FY2018 that sum was 11,803 against a range of 11,257 to 13,762. In FY2019 it was 11,833 against 11,296 to 13,801, and in FY2020 11,577 against the same range. [S4] [S5] [S6]
- Against the midpoint, it fell about 707, 716 and 972 short in those three years (computed). The FAA also says facilities “can safely operate even with CPC staffing levels below the defined staffing range”. [S6]
Change over the term.
- From September 2016 to September 2020, CPCs fell from 10,619 to 10,268, down 351 or 3.3 percent. On-board controllers fell from 14,050 to 13,830, down 220 or 1.6 percent (computed). [S7]
- The FAA’s broader air traffic workforce, as the NAS Safety Review Team counts it, was 29,571 in FY2017 and 28,712 in FY2019. [S7]
- Overall FAA employment was 45,067 in September 2018 and 45,132 in September 2020. [S61] [S63]
The shutdown.
- GAO says the 2018-19 lapse “stopped all hiring and training activities” and cost the FAA its FY2019 hiring target “by about 400”. [S8]
- The FAA’s own plan cut projected FY2019 hires from 1,431 to 907. It gave three reasons: FY2018 headcount ending nearly 200 above forecast, the funding lapse, and fewer well-qualified applicants. [S4]
- CRS reports that Academy training halted and trainees were furloughed, creating “roughly a one-month backlog”. [S29]
COVID-19.
- The FAA suspended Academy training for four months from late March 2020, and on-the-job training stopped or slowed at many facilities. [S8]
- The OIG says on-the-job training at critical facilities paused for periods from seven months to nearly two years. [S76]
- The National Training Initiative, a structured on-the-job training program begun in July 2019, was paused from March 2020 and relaunched in March 2022. [S75]
- The FY2021 hiring target was cut from 910 to 500 because of the pandemic. [S8]
Safety inspectors. Aviation safety inspectors numbered 4,282 at the end of FY2016, 4,036 at the end of FY2019 and 4,175 at the end of FY2020. The FY2017 and FY2018 counts were not obtained. [S71] [S72] [S73]
- During the shutdown most inspectors were initially furloughed. 2,148, about half, had been recalled by the final week. [S29]
- GAO reported in January 2021 that more than half of the FAA’s safety inspector and engineer workforces would be eligible to retire by 2025. [S70]
What the overseers found
| Date | Body | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| 2017-08-31 | GAO (GAO-17-450) | NextGen progressing; estimates within range; risks from funding, equipage, possible ATC restructuring, leadership stability and cybersecurity. [S9] |
| 2017-09-05 | DOT OIG | ADS-B ground-system acceptance tests relied on “targets of opportunity” when about 5 percent of aircraft were equipped, so they “were not adequate” to show coverage met requirements (snippet only). [S86] |
| [publication date not available] | DOT OIG, runway safety audit | Runway incursions rose “nearly 83 percent” from FY2011 (954) to FY2017 (1,744) (snippet only). [S85] |
| 2019-03-27 | Senate Commerce aviation subcommittee | Hearing with Elwell, Inspector General Calvin Scovel and NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt. [S50] |
| 2019-09-12 | DOT OIG letter | ADS-B Out equipage at 76 percent for commercial operators, 44 percent for general aviation. [S16] |
| 2019-09-25 | House aviation subcommittee | Elwell: delegation “is not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority”, citing the 2018 Act’s direction to delegate more certification tasks. [S51] |
| 2019-09-26 | NTSB | Seven safety recommendations to the FAA from the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes; Sumwalt cited “a gap between the assumptions used to certify the MAX and the real-world experiences of these crews”. [S47] |
| 2019-09-26 | Washington Post (snippet) | “The agency has missed several key deadlines to implement mandates” in the 2018 Act. [S55] |
| 2019-10-11 | Joint Authorities Technical Review | Nine civil aviation authorities and NASA delivered findings and 12 main recommendations, faulting outdated FAA certification procedures and insufficient technical staff. [S1] [S49] |
| 2019-10-23 | DOT OIG | The FAA needed to restore public confidence in certification and faced a “significant oversight challenge” with delegated companies (as the FAA’s chronology summarizes it). [S1] |
| 2019-11-19 | NTSB | Southwest 1380 probable cause: a fatigue-cracked fan blade; seven recommendations, five to the FAA. [S48] |
| 2019-12-11 | House T&I Committee | Hearing with Dickson. Chair Peter DeFazio: “Your job, Administrator Dickson, is to regulate. The only thing you should be promoting is the highest possible level of safety.” [S52] |
| 2019-12-18 | DOT OIG | Most operators would meet the ADS-B deadline; the FAA had not finalized access procedures for non-equipped aircraft. [S17] |
| 2020-01-16 | DOT-appointed Special Committee | The FAA correctly treated the MAX as an update to older 737s; it “gave high marks overall” to the certification process (as the FAA’s chronology summarizes it). [S1] |
| 2020-04-23 | GAO (GAO-20-513PR) | DOT-wide: of 16 priority recommendations identified in April 2019, DOT had implemented 8, including aviation cybersecurity actions; GAO added 8, for 16 open. [S54] |
| 2020-06-17 | Senate Commerce Committee | Hearing on FAA certification oversight with Dickson and Michael Stumo, father of an Ethiopian 302 victim. [S53] |
| 2020-06-29 | DOT OIG (AV2020037) | A factual timeline of the MAX 8 certification from Boeing’s January 2012 application; no recommendations. [S45] |
| 2020-09-16 | House T&I majority staff | Final MAX report (238 pages): production pressure, faulty design assumptions, a “culture of concealment”, “conflicted representation” in FAA oversight and Boeing’s influence over the FAA. It is a Democratic majority-staff product; no minority report was found. [S42] [S43] |
| December 2020 | Senate Commerce Committee (Chairman Roger Wicker) | Staff report on FAA aviation safety oversight from an investigation begun in April 2019; a summary says it drew on 57 whistleblowers (date and count credibly reported). [S49] |
| 2021-02-23 (after term) | DOT OIG (AV2021020) | The FAA and Boeing followed the established process for the MAX 8, but guidance and oversight of Boeing’s delegated organization had gaps; 14 recommendations, all accepted. [S46] |
- One 2018 Act mandate went unmet in the term. CNBC reported in 2022 that, under Trump, the FAA “issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking but never proposed new rules” on the flight-attendant rest period that the 2018 Act directed. [S56]
- Other hearings: the 2019-10-29 Senate Commerce hearing on the MAX had no FAA witness. [S50]
Safety and performance metrics over the term
Airline and civil accidents, by calendar year (NTSB). Part 121 counts are accidents / fatal accidents / deaths.
| Year | Part 121 | All US civil aviation | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 31 / 0 / 0 | 1,335 / 221 / 408 | [S57] |
| 2017 | 32 / 0 / 0 | 1,315 / 211 / 347 | [S57] |
| 2018 | 31 / 1 / 1 | 1,347 / 231 / 395 | [S57] |
| 2019 | 40 / 2 / 4 | 1,301 / 248 / 452 | [S57] |
| 2020 | No fatal Part 121 accidents | General aviation deaths 332 | [S58] |
- Southwest 1380. The one airline passenger death was on Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 on 2018-04-17, after a fan-blade failure. The NTSB’s chair called it the first US airline passenger fatality since 2009. [S48]
- Atlas Air. An Atlas Air Boeing 767 cargo jet flying for Amazon crashed near Houston on 2019-02-23, killing the three aboard. [S1] The other 2019 fatal Part 121 accident was not described in the sources read.
- The term in total. Across calendar 2017 to 2020 the NTSB tables show three fatal Part 121 accidents and five deaths. Part 121 includes cargo airlines. [S57] [S58]
- The decade. The NTSB said in 2021 that US airlines had no passenger fatalities “in seven of the last 10 years”. [S58]
- 2020 traffic. In 2020 US air carrier flight hours fell 55 percent, from 19.8 million to 8.9 million. [S58]
- 2020 passengers. US airlines carried 369 million passengers in 2020, down 60 percent from 927 million in 2019. [S69]
- General aviation rate. The NTSB’s general aviation fatal accident rate was 1.064 per 100,000 flight hours in 2019 and 1.049 in 2020. [S58]
Runway incursions, by fiscal year (FAA).
| FY | Total | Category A+B rate per million operations | Category A+B count |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 1,561 | 0.380 | not obtained |
| 2017 | 1,748 | 0.159 | not obtained |
| 2018 | 1,832 | 0.1323 (preliminary) | not obtained |
| 2019 | 1,753 | series replaced | 12 |
| 2020 | 1,261 | series replaced | 15 |
Sources: FAA regional tables [S59]; FAA performance reports [S61]; OIG [S60].
- The FAA met its 0.395 target in every year the rate was reported.
- In FY2019 the FAA replaced the Category A+B rate with a weighted “surface safety risk index”, so the two halves of this table are different measures. [S62]
- The OIG’s own chart gives 1,744 for FY2017. [S85]
FAA performance measures, by fiscal year (latest report’s value).
| Measure | FY2016 | FY2017 | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commercial air carrier fatality rate per 100 million persons on board | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.11 | 0.61 | 0.72 | [S61] [S62] [S63] |
| Most serious losses of separation per 1,000 losses | 2.66 | 2.44 | 3.58 | 2.083 | not reported | [S61] [S62] |
| General aviation fatal accident rate per 100,000 hours | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.94 | 0.902 | [S61] [S62] [S63] |
| Performance targets met | not read | not read | 13 of 15 | 15 of 16 | 16 of 17 | [S61] [S62] [S63] |
- The FAA restates preliminary values in later reports; each cell uses the latest report read. [S61] [S62]
- Two agencies, two counts. The FAA measures are by fiscal year; the NTSB tables above are by calendar year. The FAA’s commercial fatality rate is non-zero in FY2016 and FY2017, years in which the NTSB shows no Part 121 deaths. The FAA reports read do not list the events the measure counts or define which operations it covers, so this record cannot reconcile the two. Likewise the general aviation fatal accident rates differ (NTSB 1.064 in calendar 2019; FAA 0.94 in FY2019) because the period and the agency’s method differ.
- Serious near-collisions. The FAA’s rate of the most serious losses of separation is available for FY2016 to FY2019 only (2.66 to 2.083 per 1,000 losses), so there is no end-year value and no common basis for this indicator across the term.
- The FAA’s air traffic report averages FY2017-2019 at 391 Core 30 (busiest-airport) runway incursions and 1,221 losses of standard separation across its en route centers a year. That is a pre-pandemic baseline, not a term-end figure. [S64]
System performance (DOT and BTS).
| Year | On-time arrivals | Cancellations | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 81.4% | 1.17% | 12 reporting carriers | [S65] |
| 2018 | 79.2% | 1.7% | reporting marketing carriers | [S66] |
| 2019 | 79.0% | 1.9% | reporting marketing carriers | [S66] |
| 2020 | 84.5% | 6.0% | reporting marketing carriers | [S67] |
- 2017 was not obtained, and the reporting base changed between 2016 and 2018.
- The share of delays attributed to the National Airspace System (the FAA’s side) was not obtained for any year.
- On 2019-01-25, the 35th day of the shutdown, the FAA held flights to LaGuardia, citing “a slight increase in sick leave at two air traffic control facilities”. The government reopened the same day. [S1] [S29]
- CRS records that some observers called those absences a “major factor” in ending the shutdown. That is an attributed claim, not a CRS finding. [S29]
- In 2020 the FAA closed some facilities temporarily after positive COVID-19 tests, including the Chicago Midway tower on 2020-03-17. [S1]
- It also cut hours at about 100 towers from 2020-04-27 “to reduce the possibility of temporary tower closures”. [S74]
The 737 MAX: crashes, grounding and return to service
The crashes and the grounding.
- Certification. Boeing applied for an amended type certificate in January 2012. The FAA and Boeing completed flight testing of the flight control system, including MCAS, on 2016-11-20. The FAA issued the amended type certificate for the MAX 8 on 2017-03-08, 47 days into the term (computed), and for the MAX 9 on 2018-02-15. The MAX 8 began commercial service on 2017-05-22. [S45] The FAA’s chronology dates the MAX 9 certificate 2018-02-16. [S1]
- Lion Air. Lion Air Flight 610, a MAX 8, crashed on 2018-10-29; all 189 aboard died. [S1]
- Ethiopian. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed on 2019-03-10; all 157 aboard died. China grounded its 96 MAX 8s at once. [S1]
- The FAA’s position. Until 2019-03-12 the FAA’s position was that its review “showed no systemic performance issues” and gave no basis to ground. [S40]
- The order. On 2019-03-13 President Trump announced the grounding. The FAA issued an emergency order citing “new information from the wreckage” and satellite data. The US acted after most major regulators had. [S39] [S40]
- Reviews ordered. Chao asked the Inspector General to audit the certification on 2019-03-19, and named a special review committee on 2019-03-25. [S1]
FAA actions during the grounding.
- On 2019-11-26 the FAA told Boeing it would keep the authority to issue airworthiness certificates for every newly built MAX itself. [S1]
- Boeing halted MAX production from January 2020 after the FAA said it would not recertify the jet by the end of 2019. [S1]
The return to service.
- Certification test flights began on 2020-06-29. Dickson flew the jet himself on 2020-09-30. [S1]
- Dickson signed the order lifting the grounding on 2020-11-18, about 20 months (616 days, computed) after it began. The order was published in the Federal Register on 2020-11-20. [S44] [S1]
- On 2020-12-01 the FAA issued its first airworthiness certificate for a MAX built since March 2019; about 450 built aircraft were waiting. American Airlines flew the first US scheduled MAX flight on 2020-12-29. [S1]
The reform law.
- On 2020-12-27 President Trump signed P.L. 116-260, whose Division V, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, made these changes:
- it required manufacturers to adopt safety management systems;
- it ordered an independent review of Boeing’s delegated organization;
- it allowed civil penalties for pressuring FAA designees;
- it required FAA approval of each new designee;
- it authorized more than $75 million over three years to recruit and retain engineers and inspectors. [S1] [S28]
- On 2021-01-07, 13 days before the term ended, the DOT OIG listed an investigation item titled “Airplane Manufacturer Charged with Conspiracy To Defraud FAA and Agrees To Pay Over $2.5 Billion”. The Justice Department published a release on the same matter. Only the title and date were read; this draft does not describe the case. [S82]
The FAA at term end (January 20, 2021)
- Leadership. Stephen Dickson, confirmed in 2019, was Administrator, and Teri Bristol still led the ATO. [S41] [S38] Elaine Chao had resigned as Secretary of Transportation effective 2021-01-11, announcing it on 2021-01-07 and citing the storming of the Capitol the day before. [S88]
- Authorization and money. The FAA was authorized through FY2023 and funded for FY2021 at $17.96 billion. Airports had received $12 billion in pandemic relief. [S27] [S18]
- Controllers. The latest count was September 2020: 13,830 on board and 10,268 CPCs. CPCs plus CPC-ITs stood at 11,577, near the low end of the FAA’s 11,296 to 13,801 range. Academy and on-the-job training were still running below normal. [S7] [S6] [S75]
- The 737 MAX. The MAX was back in US service, under design changes the FAA required, and the certification reform law awaited implementation. [S1]
- ADS-B. The ADS-B Out mandate had been in force for a year. [S16]
- Traffic. Passenger traffic was 60 percent below 2019. [S69]
Team’s Take
Team’s Take: This is analysis, not reporting. It rates each dimension from the term’s start-year (FY2016) to its end-year (FY2020), using the indicators and rulings (D5 to D7d) in the series scorecard.
| Dimension | Start of term | End of term | Rating | Confidence | Attribution note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Safety outcomes | FY2016: commercial fatality rate 0.6 per 100 million persons on board; general aviation fatal rate 0.89 per 100,000 hours; most serious losses of separation 2.66 per 1,000. CY2016: 0 Part 121 fatal accidents | FY2020: 0.72 and 0.902; losses-of-separation rate not reported (FY2019: 2.083). CY2020: 0 Part 121 fatal accidents. CY2017-2020: 3 fatal Part 121 accidents, 5 deaths | Flat | Medium | Rated on per-operation and per-hour rates because 2020 flight hours fell 55 percent (rule D7a). The rates moved little, and the commercial rate rests on very small numbers. No runway-incursion measure spans the term (the A+B rate stops at FY2018; counts start in FY2019), and serious near-collision reporting has no end-year value. None of the in-term deaths the sources describe is attributed to air traffic control |
| 2. ATC staffing | Sept 2016: 10,619 CPCs; 14,050 on board | Sept 2020: 10,268 CPCs (-3.3%); 13,830 on board (-1.6%); CPC+CPC-IT about 972 below the midpoint of the FAA’s range | Declined | High | Hiring beat plan in FY2016-FY2018. The losses trace to the 2018-19 lapse in appropriations (shared by the President and Congress), COVID-19 (not controllable) and the FY2013-FY2015 hiring misses before the term. OIG facility-staffing data for the term were not found |
| 3. Modernization delivery | FY2016: 95% of major programs within 10% of cost and schedule; ADS-B equipage about 9% of commercial aircraft (Aug 2016) | FY2020: 65%; ADS-B baseline services complete (2019-10-07) and mandate in force (2020-01-01) | Mixed | Medium | ADS-B delivery moved the right way; the cost and schedule measure moved the wrong way. The Data Comm and TFDM slips reported in 2024-2026 are not counted because the sources do not date their re-baselining (rule D7c). GAO’s unsustainable-systems count has no value for this term |
| 4. Certification and manufacturer oversight | Jan 2017: MAX 8 flight testing complete (2016-11-20), certificate pending; no adverse oversight findings in the sources read | Jan 2021: adverse findings from the JATR, NTSB, OIG and House majority staff; MAX recertified with FAA-required changes; FAA kept certificate authority for new MAXs; 2020 certification law signed | Mixed | Medium | Findings moved the wrong way, and they concern a certificate this FAA issued: the MAX 8 amended type certificate of 2017-03-08, 47 days into the term, on an application from January 2012 and testing completed under the previous administration (rule D7d). Actions moved the right way: the grounding (after most regulators), retained certificate authority, recertification and the 2020 law, which Congress wrote and the President signed. The law’s effect falls in Part 2 |
| 5. Leadership stability | Senate-confirmed Administrator (Huerta) | Senate-confirmed Administrator (Dickson) | Declined | High | No confirmed Administrator for 582 of 1,461 days, 39.8 percent of the term (computed), above the 30 percent threshold in rule D5. The vacancy opened when Huerta’s fixed five-year term ended on 2018-01-07; Dickson’s nomination hearing was on 2019-05-15. The ATO chief served throughout; the Secretary resigned nine days before the term ended |
| 6. Budget and funding | FY2016: $16.28B nominal, $22.54B in FY2026 dollars (CPI-U); F&E $3.95B real; short-term authorization | FY2020: $17.62B nominal, $22.58B real (+0.2%); F&E $3.90B real (-1.2%); five-year authorization to FY2023; one 35-day lapse in the term | Flat | High | Rated in real terms (rule D6): total funding was flat and capital funding slipped slightly. The move to a five-year authorization (better) offsets the 35-day lapse (worse). Congress set every enacted level above the President’s request |
| 7. System performance | 2016: on time 81.4%, cancelled 1.17% (12 reporting carriers) | 2020: on time 84.5%, cancelled 6.0% (reporting marketing carriers). 2019: 79.0% and 1.9% | Mixed | Medium | COVID-19 shock (rule D7a). Both measures are per-flight rates, and in 2020 they moved in opposite directions as airlines cut schedules. Before the pandemic, 2019 was worse than 2016 on both. Mostly airline-driven; the FAA-attributed delay share was not obtained, and the reporting base changed between 2016 and 2018 |
| 8. Oversight responsiveness | GAO (2017): FAA had implemented most earlier NextGen recommendations | DOT implemented 8 of 16 GAO priority recommendations (Apr 2019 to Apr 2020, department-wide); several 2018 Act deadlines missed (credibly reported) | Insufficient evidence | Low | No FAA-specific count at either endpoint. The OIG’s 2024 tally (all but 3 of more than 200 NextGen recommendations from 2005 to 2022 closed) spans several administrations and cannot be split by term [S14] |
Net assessment. On this record the FAA ended the term no better off than it began, and worse on two dimensions: it had fewer certified controllers, and it spent 40 percent of the term without a confirmed Administrator. Real funding and safety rates were flat, and modernization, certification oversight and system performance were mixed: the gains the term can claim (the ADS-B mandate, a five-year authorization, the 2020 certification law) sit beside a MAX 8 certificate, issued early in the term, whose approval the OIG, the JATR and the House majority staff later faulted. Much of the staffing decline came from a pandemic the administration could not control and a funding lapse it shared with Congress.
What the term left behind. Three choices from these years still shape the agency. The push to move air traffic control out of government failed in Congress in 2018, so modernization stayed tied to annual appropriations. Congress passed a five-year law instead, which ran to 2023. And the response to the MAX crashes reversed direction on delegation: the 2018 law had told the FAA to hand more certification work to manufacturers, and the 2020 law tightened the agency’s control over that work, leaving its implementation to the next administration.
(Analysis developed with AI assistance; reviewed by [editor name])
The Counterfactual
The Counterfactual: The strongest case against the net assessment above is this.
- The safety record held. US airline and cargo operations had three fatal accidents and five deaths across calendar 2017 to 2020. The one the sources describe in detail, Southwest 1380, came from a fan blade that cracked through metal fatigue, which the NTSB traced to the engine and its cowl, not to air traffic control or FAA staffing; the NTSB did send the FAA five recommendations, including on fan-cowl integrity, a certification matter. The FAA met almost all of its own performance targets: 13 of 15 in FY2018, 15 of 16 in FY2019 and 16 of 17 in FY2020. [S48] [S61] [S62] [S63]
- Most of the MAX 8 work came before the term. Boeing applied in January 2012, and the FAA and Boeing finished flight-testing the flight control system, including MCAS, on 2016-11-20. The FAA under this administration issued the certificate on 2017-03-08, 47 days in. [S45] The DOT-appointed Special Committee found the FAA’s process safe and effective, as the FAA’s chronology summarizes it, and the OIG later found that the FAA and Boeing “followed the established certification process”. [S1] [S45] [S46] The fiercest findings came from a House majority-staff report with no minority counterpart.
- The staffing losses were mostly not policy. The FAA beat its hiring plan in FY2016, FY2017 and FY2018. The FY2019 and FY2020 shortfalls followed a shutdown and a pandemic. [S7] [S8]
- Privatization was a real reform argument. The Administration proposed a self-financing, non-profit air traffic organization. [S3] Chairman Shuster framed it as “shrinking the federal government by 35,000 employees, cutting taxes and stopping wasteful spending”, and NPR reported the controllers’ union as “generally supportive”. [S24] [S25] It failed in Congress, not because it was tried and did not work.
The record supports the first and third points as facts. The second is partly supported: most of the certification work preceded the term, but the certificate itself was issued in it. It does not settle whether the FAA should have grounded the MAX sooner: the FAA’s stated reason for acting on 2019-03-13 was new evidence, and the sources do not show whether that evidence was available earlier. [S40] Nor do the sources show whether privatization would have sped modernization, because it was never enacted.
Connections
Connections:
- → The FAA under Biden hired more controllers as its systems aged: Part 2. The certification law, the controller hiring recovery and the 2021-2025 safety record pick up where this part ends.
- → The FAA under Trump was mid-rebuild when a router problem halted US flights: Part 3. The same scorecard applied from 2025-01-20.
- → The FAA, 2016–2026: A Timeline: the dated chronology behind all three parts.
- → Federal Aviation Administration — Agency Damage Assessment: the FAA’s Agency Damage Assessment, which covers 2025 onward.
- → Elaine Chao — Political Accountability Profile: Secretary of Transportation from 2017-01-31 until her resignation took effect on 2021-01-11; she ordered the MAX certification reviews.
- → Donald Trump — 45th and 47th President of the United States: announced the ATC privatization plan (2017-06-05) and the MAX grounding (2019-03-13); signed the 2018 Act and the 2020 certification law.
- → Sam Graves — U.S. Representative (MO-6), Transportation Committee Chair: House Transportation Committee Republican leader during the MAX hearings.
- → John Thune Profile: the senator Shuster named as his partner on the 2018 reauthorization after dropping privatization.
(Connections AI-surfaced; human verification required before publication.)
Civic Action
Civic Action: These mechanisms exist to check or follow this record.
- Check the controller numbers yourself. The FAA publishes an annual Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan to Congress on faa.gov, with on-board counts by facility.
- Read the audits. DOT Inspector General reports are at oig.dot.gov. GAO reports, with the status of each recommendation, are at gao.gov; search the recommendations database by agency.
- Read the laws. The 2018 Act (P.L. 115-254) and the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Division V of P.L. 116-260) are on congress.gov, with their legislative histories.
- Look up accidents and runway events. Accident records are in the NTSB’s CAROL database (ntsb.gov). The FAA posts runway incursion statistics on its Runway Safety pages.
- Oversight bodies. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Aviation Subcommittee and the Senate Commerce Committee’s aviation subcommittee hold FAA oversight hearings. The DOT OIG runs a hotline for reports of fraud, waste and safety concerns.
Evidence Trail
- → Primary source: FAA Finance staffing snapshot, as reproduced in the NAS Safety Review Team report (2023-11-15), for controller counts FY2011-FY2022 [S7]
- → Primary source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification, ten-year tables, for requested and enacted funding FY2016-FY2021 [S18]; BLS CPI-U series CUUR0000SA0 for the FY2026-dollar figures [S89]
- → Primary source: DOT OIG AV2020037 (2020-06-29), the MAX 8 certification timeline [S45]
- → Primary source: NTSB annual aviation summaries CY2016-CY2019 and the 2020 statistics release [S57] [S58]
- → Citizen Analyst Knowledge Base: The FAA, 2016–2026: A Timeline, the dated chronology for all three parts; Federal Aviation Administration — Agency Damage Assessment, the FAA’s Agency Damage Assessment (2025 onward)
- → External verification: faa.gov Controller Workforce Plans; oig.dot.gov; gao.gov recommendations database; NTSB CAROL
The numbered list below is the provenance chain for every bracketed reference above.
Sources
Dates are publication dates. “[publication date not available]” marks a source whose page did not show one. Sources marked “snippet” were seen as search-result text, not read in full.
- [S1] FAA History Office, “2013-2021 Update to FAA Historical Chronology”, [publication date not available; file posted under /2022-01/]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-01/2013_2021_chronology.pdf
- [S2] DOT OIG, “Key Issues Facing FAA’s Air Traffic Controller Workforce” (CC-2016-010), statement before the House Aviation Subcommittee, 2016-06-15. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Key%20Issues%20Facing%20FAA%27s%20ATC%20Workforce%20Statement%5E6-15-16.pdf
- [S3] FAA, “2017-2026 Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan”, [publication date not available; file name dated 8.1.2017]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/2017-Controller-Workforce-Plan-8.1.-2017.pdf
- [S4] FAA, “Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2019-2028”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/2018-ABA-200-CWP_2019_Report_508.pdf
- [S5] FAA, “Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2020-2029”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/2019-ABA-001-CWP_2019_508c.pdf
- [S6] FAA, “Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2021-2030”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-11/FY21_Controller_Workforce_Plan.pdf
- [S7] FAA National Airspace System Safety Review Team, “Discussion and Recommendations To Address Risk in the National Airspace System”, 2023-11-15 (Figure 5, FAA Finance Staffing Data Snapshot, FY2011-FY2022). https://www.faa.gov/NAS_safety_review_team_report.pdf
- [S8] GAO, “Air Traffic Control Workforce: FAA Should Establish Goals and Better Assess Its Hiring Processes” (GAO-26-107320), 2025-12-17. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107320/index.html
- [S9] GAO, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: Progress and Challenges in Implementing NextGen” (GAO-17-450), 2017-08-31. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-450
- [S10] GAO, “Next Generation Air Transportation System: Information on Expenditures, Schedule, and Cost Estimates, Fiscal Years 2004-2030” (GAO-17-241R), 2016-11-17. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-241r
- [S11] GAO, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges” (GAO-24-105254), 2023-11-09. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254
- [S12] DOT OIG, “FAA Has Begun To Deploy TFDM, but Cost Growth Has Resulted in Significant Program Changes and Delayed Benefits” (AV2024031), 2024-07-17. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46321
- [S13] DOT OIG, “FAA Can Improve the Reliability of Overall Benefit and Cost Projections for NextGen by Fully Assessing the Impact of External Factors” (AV2025036), 2025-07-23 (snippet for the Data Comm and TFDM figures). https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/library-items/FAA%20NextGen%20External%20Factors%20Final%20Report_7-23-25.pdf
- [S14] DOT OIG, “FAA’s Report on Air Traffic Modernization Presents an Incomplete and Out-of-Date Assessment of NextGen” (AV2024023), 2024-04-30. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/library-items/FAA%20NextGen%20Status%20Report_4.30.24.pdf
- [S15] DOT OIG, “Total Costs, Schedules, and Benefits of FAA’s NextGen Transformational Programs Remain Uncertain”, 2016-11-10 (snippet). https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA’s%20Transformational%20Programs%20Report_issued%20Nov%2010_508.pdf
- [S16] DOT OIG, letter to House T&I on ADS-B Out equipage rates (CC2019003), 2019-09-12. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20ADS-B%20Equipage%20Out%20Final%20Letter%5E9-12-19_0.pdf
- [S17] DOT OIG, “NextGen Equipage: ADS-B Out Equipage Rates Are Increasing, but FAA Must Address Airspace Access Issues”, 2019-12-18. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/37626
- [S18] FAA, “FY 2027 President’s Budget Submission” (Congressional Justification), Ten Year Tables and Capital Investment Plan, 2026-04-03 (release date per CRS R49341). https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/FAA_FY_2027_Budget_Estimates_CJ.pdf
- [S19] CRS, “DOT Appropriations: FY2019” (R45321), 2018-09-25. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R45321.html
- [S20] CRS, “Submission of the President’s Budget in Transition Years” (RS20752), [publication date not available]. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS20752
- [S21] CBO, “An Analysis of the President’s 2019 Budget”, [publication date not available], https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53884 ; “An Analysis of the President’s 2020 Budget”, [publication date not available], https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55958 ; “An Analysis of the President’s 2021 Budget”, [publication date not available], https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56301 ; “An Analysis of the President’s 2017 Budget”, March 2016 (the cover gives the month; no day), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51383-apbonecol.pdf
- [S22] White House (Trump archive), “Administration Presents President Trump’s Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request”, 2019-03-11. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/administration-presents-president-trumps-fiscal-year-2020-budget-request
- [S23] Congress.gov, H.R. 2997 (115th Congress), 21st Century AIRR Act, all actions, [publication date not available]. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2997/all-actions
- [S24] USA Today, “Top House advocate to privatize air traffic control drops effort”, 2018-02-27. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/27/faa-air-traffic-control-privatization/379647002
- [S25] NPR, “Trump Announces Plan To Privatize Air Traffic Control”, 2017-06-05 (snippet; page fetch failed). https://www.npr.org/2017/06/05/531574945/trump-announces-plan-to-privatize-air-traffic-control
- [S26] House T&I Committee Democrats, “Air Traffic Control Privatization”, [publication date not available]. https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/air-traffic-control-privatization
- [S27] Congress.gov, H.R. 302 (115th Congress), FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. 115-254, enacted 2018-10-05. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/302
- [S28] CRS, “FAA Reauthorization Issues for the 118th Congress” (R47608), [publication date not available]. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R47608.html
- [S29] CRS, “Federal Government Shutdowns and the Impact on Civil Aviation” (R49491), 2026-10-22. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49491
- [S30] GovInfo, Public Law 115-250, Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2018, Part II, signed 2018-09-29. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ250/html/PLAW-115publ250.htm
- [S31] Congress.gov, Public Law 115-141, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Division M, signed 2018-03-23. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf
- [S32] Congress.gov, H.R. 3823 summary, Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-63), signed 2017-09-29. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3823/summary/00
- [S33] U.S. Senate Daily Press, floor log for 2019-07-23. https://www.dailypress.senate.gov/tuesday-july-22-2019
- [S34] DOT, “U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao Statement on Confirmation of Steve Dickson as FAA Administrator”, 2019-07-24. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-secretary-transportation-elaine-l-chao-statement-confirmation-steve-dickson-faa
- [S35] Politico (Brianna Gurciullo), “New FAA chief confirmed amid continuing Boeing 737 MAX turmoil”, 2019-07-24. https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/24/faa-chief-confirmed-boeing-737-max-1432231
- [S36] GovInfo, S. Hrg. 116-596, “Nomination of Stephen M. Dickson, Nominee to be Administrator, FAA” (hearing 2019-05-15, with responses to written questions from Sens. Cantwell and Blumenthal), [publication date not available]. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116shrg52695/html/CHRG-116shrg52695.htm
- [S37] House T&I Committee, “Ranking Members Sam Graves & Garret Graves Statements on Confirmation of Dickson to Lead FAA”, [publication date not available] (snippet). https://transportation.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404396
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- [S40] BBC, “Boeing grounds entire 737 Max crash aircraft fleet”, 2019-03-14; The Regulatory Review, “The Grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX”, 2019-03-19. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47562727 ; https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/19/nakahara-grounding-boeing-737-max
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- [S42] House T&I Committee Democrats, “After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX”, 2020-09-16. https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/after-18-month-investigation-chairs-defazio-and-larsen-release-final-committee-report-on-boeing-737-max
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- [S46] DOT OIG, “Weaknesses in FAA’s Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the 737 MAX 8” (AV2021020), 2021-02-23. http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38302
- [S47] NTSB, “NTSB Issues 7 Safety Recommendations to FAA related to Ongoing Lion Air, Ethiopian Airlines Crash Investigations”, 2019-09-26 (snippet). https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190926.aspx
- [S48] NTSB, press release on Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 (NR20191119), 2019-11-19. https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20191119.aspx
- [S49] U.S. Senate Commerce Committee, “Committee Investigation Report: Aviation Safety Oversight”, December 2020 (the cover gives the month; no day). https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/media/doc/CST%20FAA%20Aviation%20Safety%20Oversight%20Report.pdf
- [S50] Senate Commerce Committee hearing pages: “The State of Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation” (2019-03-27), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-airline-safety-federal-oversight-of-commercial-aviation ; “Aviation Safety and the Future of Boeing’s 737 MAX” (2019-10-29), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/meetings/aviation-safety-and-the-future-of-boeings-737-max ; [publication dates not available]
- [S51] GovInfo, “Status of the Boeing 737 MAX” (CHRG-116hhrg37277) and Congress.gov witness statement of Daniel K. Elwell (hearing 2019-09-25), [publication date not available] (search-result text). https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110007/witnesses/HHRG-116-AP20-Wstate-ElwellD-20190925.pdf
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- [S58] NTSB, “U.S. Civil Aviation Fatalities and Flight Activity Decreased in 2020”, 2021-11-17. https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20211117.aspx
- [S59] FAA, “Runway Incursion Totals for FY 2016” through “FY 2021” (regional tables), [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/statistics/regional/index.cfm?fy=2017 (same pattern for each year)
- [S60] DOT OIG, “FAA Has Taken Steps To Prevent and Mitigate Runway Incursions…” (AV2025026), 2025-03-12. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/library-items/FAA%20Runway%20Incursions%20Final%20Report_3.12.25.pdf
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- [S62] FAA, “FY 2019 Performance and Accountability Report”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/afn/offices/finance/offices/budget/par/fy19-par.pdf
- [S63] FAA, “FY 2020 Summary of Performance and Financial Information”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/plans_reports/2020-FAA-PAR-Summary.pdf
- [S64] FAA Air Traffic Organization, “Air Traffic by the Numbers FY2024”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers/air-traffic-by-the-numbers-FY2024.pdf
- [S65] DOT, “2016 Flight Cancellation, Mishandled Baggage, and Bumping Rates are Lowest in Decades”, 2017-02-14. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot2017
- [S66] BTS, “Air Travel Consumer Report: December 2019, Full Year 2019 Numbers”, [publication date not available]. https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/air-travel-consumer-report-december-2019-full-year-2019-numbers
- [S67] BTS, “Air Travel Consumer Report: December 2020, Full Year 2020 Numbers”, [publication date not available]. https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/air-travel-consumer-report-december-2020-full-year-2020-numbers
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- [S73] FAA, “Aviation Safety Workforce Plan 2021-2030”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/plans_reports/wfp_2021.pdf
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- [S77] FAA, “U.S. Department of Transportation Issues Two Much-Anticipated Drone Rules to Advance Safety and Innovation”, [publication date not available; announcement dated 2020-12-28 in the FAA chronology], https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/us-department-transportation-issues-two-much-anticipated-drone-rules-advance-safety-and ; Federal Register, “Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft” (2020-28948), 2021-01-15, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/15/2020-28948/remote-identification-of-unmanned-aircraft
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- [S79] FAA, “NextGen Accomplishments by Fiscal Year”, [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/background/accomplishments
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- [S83] DOT OIG, “Changes in Requirements and Schedule Delays Contributed to the Termination of the NAS Voice System Contract”, 2022-01-12: title and date as listed under “Related Library Items” on the OIG page for AV2025036, https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46878 (the report itself was not opened).
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- [S87] Washington Technology (Mark Hoover), “Harris adds $331M DCIS contract to its FAA stable”, 2012-09-21. https://www.washingtontechnology.com/2012/09/harris-adds-331m-dcis-contract-to-its-faa-stable/337652
- [S88] Politico, “Chao resigns from Transportation Department, citing ‘traumatic,’ ‘avoidable’ Capitol riot”, 2021-01-07 (search-result text: resignation effective 2021-01-11). https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/07/elaine-chao-to-resign-as-transportation-secretary-455919
- [S89] Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), U.S. city average, all items, series CUUR0000SA0, data extracted 2026-11-17; fiscal-year averages and FY2026-dollar deflators as tabulated in the series file
cpi-u-fiscal-year.md. https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0
Citizen Analyst Knowledge Base: Federal Aviation Administration — Agency Damage Assessment, the FAA’s Agency Damage Assessment draft, is the series’ reference for the FAA after 2025.
Initial research and drafting assisted by AI; all facts independently verified by [editor name].
