The FAA under Biden hired more controllers as its systems aged
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The FAA under Biden hired more controllers as its systems aged

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The FAA under Biden hired more controllers as its systems aged

Last updated: November 17, 2026

DRAFT — research draft, 2026-11-17. Not for publication until editor review.

Part 2 of 3 in a series on the FAA across three administrations. Part 1 covers 2017 to 2021; Part 3 covers 2025 to the present.

The Brief

The FAA runs air traffic control and checks that planes are safe. From January 2021 to January 2025, under President Biden, it went almost 19 months with no confirmed leader. Controller hiring climbed from a pandemic low of 510 in 2021 to 1,811 in 2024. That is about where it was in 2017. The number of fully trained controllers grew only a little. Serious runway close calls rose in 2023, then fell in 2024. Congress added $5 billion for air traffic buildings, but the FAA’s yearly budget shrank after inflation. Its old radar and computer systems kept aging. Critics blame Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. The record backs some of their claims, but not others.

Why It Matters

Every airline flight in the United States depends on the FAA’s air traffic system. When the agency is short of staff or its equipment fails, travelers face delays, flight caps and thinner safety margins. The years 2021 to 2025 are now part of a political fight. After a nationwide ground stop on 2026-11-13, the current administration blamed the last one, and the former Secretary blamed the current one. To judge those claims, a reader needs to know what the FAA had in 2021, what changed, and what it passed on in 2025. This is Part 2 of a three-part series that grades each administration on the same scorecard.

The Facts

A note on terms used throughout. A Certified Professional Controller (CPC) is a controller fully certified to work every position at a facility; trainees are CPCs-in-training (CPC-IT, already certified elsewhere and retraining) plus developmental controllers. A TRACON is a radar facility that handles planes near busy airports. F&E (Facilities and Equipment) is the FAA’s capital account. Fiscal years (FY) end on September 30. The series compares each term’s last full fiscal year in office (here FY2024) with the last full fiscal year before it began (FY2020). Dollar figures are nominal (not adjusted for inflation) unless labelled “FY2026 dollars, CPI-U”.

The FAA on day one (2021-01-20)

  • Leadership. Steve Dickson, a former Delta executive and pilot, had been the Senate-confirmed Administrator since he was sworn in on 2019-08-12, and stayed on into the new administration. (Source: FAA Historical Chronology 2013-2021; Politico, 2022-02-16)
  • Controller staffing, end of FY2020 (September 2020). 13,830 controllers at facilities, of whom 10,268 were CPCs, 1,309 CPC-ITs and 2,253 developmentals. The FAA hired 920 controllers in FY2020 against a plan of 910. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, Figure 5, citing FAA Finance staffing data, 2023-11-15)
  • Training had stopped. The FAA closed its Academy for about four months from late March 2020 and paused on-the-job training at critical facilities for periods of seven months to nearly two years. (Source: DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) AV2023035, 2023-06-21)
  • The FY2021 hiring goal was cut from 910 to 500 because of the pandemic. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15; National Academies, The Air Traffic Controller Workforce Imperative, 2025-06-18)
  • Boeing 737 MAX. The FAA lifted the 20-month grounding of the 737 MAX on 2020-11-18. On 2020-12-27 the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act required manufacturers to adopt safety management systems and ordered an expert review of Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA, the program under which the FAA delegates some certification work to company employees). (Source: FAA Historical Chronology 2013-2021) A month into the term, the OIG found gaps in the FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s ODA and made 14 recommendations. (Source: DOT OIG AV2021020, 2021-02-23)
  • Budget. FY2021 appropriations were enacted on 2020-12-27, signed by President Trump: Operations $11,001.5 million, F&E $3,015 million, Research, Engineering and Development (RE&D) $198 million, Airport Improvement Program $3,350 million plus $400 million from the general fund. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 authorized programs through FY2023. (Source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification, Ten-Year Tables, 2026-04-03)
  • Capital programs were already behind. In FY2020 only 65 percent of the FAA’s major baselined programs were within 10 percent of their cost and schedule targets, against a 90 percent goal. (Source: FAA FY2020 Performance and Accountability Report summary)
  • Safety baseline. In FY2020 there were 1,261 runway incursions (any incorrect presence of a plane, vehicle or person on a runway), 15 of them serious (Category A or B). Traffic was depressed by the pandemic. (Source: DOT OIG AV2025026, 2025-03-12) The FAA’s commercial air carrier fatality rate in FY2020 was 0.72 per 100 million persons on board, against a target of 5.7. (Source: FAA FY2020 Performance and Accountability Report summary) That rate is an FAA fiscal-year measure whose exact scope the sources read do not state; it is not the NTSB’s calendar-year count of Part 121 airline accidents, which is why it can be nonzero in a year with no Part 121 deaths (NTSB recorded none in 2020; see Part 1).
  • No major fatal airliner crash since 2009. Reuters reported on 2023-05-24 that the U.S. had not had a major fatal passenger-airline crash since February 2009. Part 121 operations did have fatal accidents that were not airliner crashes: one in 2018 and two in 2019, per the NTSB (see Part 1). (Source: Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2023-05-24)
  • Airline performance in 2020. On-time arrivals were 84.5 percent and cancellations 6.0 percent of scheduled flights, both distorted by the collapse in travel. In 2019, the last normal year, they were 79.0 percent and 1.9 percent. (Source: BTS Air Travel Consumer Reports, full years 2019 and 2020)
  • FAA total headcount in January 2021 was not found in a primary source. The nearest figures are on a different basis: the NAS Safety Review Team counts 38,346 FAA employees on board at end FY2019 and 39,436 at end FY2023. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15)

Leadership and management

Role Person Dates How the post was held
Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg Confirmed 2021-02-02 (86 to 13) to 2025-01-20 Confirmed
FAA Administrator Steve Dickson Sworn in 2019-08-12; left 2022-03-31 Confirmed; resignation announced 2022-02-16
Acting Administrator Billy Nolen From Dickson’s exit on 2022-03-31 to June 2023 Acting; departure announced 2023-04-19
Nominee Phil Washington Announced July 2022; asked to withdraw 2023-03-24, announced 2023-03-25, formally withdrawn 2023-03-30 Never voted on
Acting Administrator Polly Trottenberg (also Deputy Secretary of Transportation) 2023-06-08 to October 2023 Acting
FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker Confirmed 2023-10-24; sworn in 2023-10-25; left 2025-01-20 Confirmed 98 to 0

Sources for the table: Senate roll call vote 11, 2021-02-02; FAA Historical Chronology 2013-2021; Politico, 2022-02-16; CNBC, 2022-02-17; House Transportation and Infrastructure (T&I) Committee hearing memo, 2024-02-06; CBS News (Trump appoints new FAA administrator, “acting administrators since March 2022”); FAA Historical Chronology 2022-April 2024; Eno Center, 2023-03-26; Congress.gov PN9; Senate roll call vote 263, 2023-10-24; Whitaker testimony, 2024-02-06 (swearing-in date). Nolen’s own swearing-in date as acting Administrator was not found.

  • Dickson resigned effective 2022-03-31, after 2 years and about 7.5 months in office, citing time away from his family: “it is time to go home.” (Source: CNBC, 2022-02-17)
  • The vacancy lasted 573 days (from 2022-03-31 to Whitaker’s swearing-in on 2023-10-25, computed; the series counts tenure from the swearing-in), about 18.8 months and 39.2 percent of the 1,461-day term. The House T&I majority staff counted “18 months” with two acting Administrators. (Source: House T&I hearing memo, 2024-02-06; NBC News, 2023-10-24)
  • Share of the term with a sworn-in, Senate-confirmed Administrator: 888 of 1,461 days, 60.8 percent (computed: 435 days under Dickson plus 453 under Whitaker).
  • The Washington nomination. Biden named Phil Washington, chief executive of Denver International Airport, in July 2022 (Sen. Ted Cruz’s account); the Senate Commerce Committee heard him on 2023-03-01. (Source: Eno Center, 2023-03-26; Congress.gov PN9) On 2023-03-02 House T&I Chair Sam Graves and Sen. Cruz wrote that Washington, who had retired from the Army, failed the statute’s “civilian” and “experience in a field directly related to aviation” requirements. (Source: Graves and Cruz letter, 2023-03-02) The committee postponed its vote on 2023-03-22, with Sens. Kyrsten Sinema and Jon Tester undecided and senators in both parties raising concerns. Washington asked to withdraw on 2023-03-24; it was announced on 2023-03-25 and formally sent to the Senate on 2023-03-30. (Source: Politico, 2023-03-26; Eno Center, 2023-03-26; Congress.gov PN9)
  • Competing accounts of the withdrawal. Buttigieg: “The partisan attacks and procedural obstruction he has faced are undeserved.” A White House official blamed an “onslaught of unfounded Republican attacks.” Cruz: “this wasn’t the time for an administrator who needed on-the-job training.” (Source: Eno Center, 2023-03-26; Politico, 2023-03-26)
  • Whitaker, a former FAA deputy administrator, was nominated 2023-09-07 (166 days after Washington’s withdrawal was announced, computed), confirmed 98 to 0 on 2023-10-24 and sworn in the next day. (Source: Politico, 2023-09-07; Senate roll call vote 263, 2023-10-24)
  • Turnover below the top. During the vacancy, senior leadership changed in five FAA lines of business and many executive posts were held by acting officials, according to the House T&I majority staff. (Source: House T&I hearing memo, 2024-02-06)
  • Congress later tightened eligibility. The 2024 reauthorization bars an active-duty or retired military officer from serving as Administrator and requires management experience in an aviation field. (Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) IF12791, 2024-10-23)
  • The 5G dispute. In January 2022 AT&T and Verizon agreed, after first refusing, to delay new C-band 5G service by two weeks and set buffer zones around about 50 airports over concerns about interference with aircraft altimeters. (Source: CNBC, 2022-01-03; CNBC, 2022-01-17) The FAA says the airline fleet had retrofitted by September 2023 and the risk “has been mitigated.” (Source: FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety page)
  • Whitaker’s exit. In September 2024, after the FAA proposed about $600,000 in fines against SpaceX, Elon Musk posted that Whitaker “needs to resign.” (Source: CBS News) On 2024-12-12 Whitaker told employees he would step down on 2025-01-20; he did not publicly attribute the decision to Musk or to the incoming administration. (Source: FAA General Statements, entry of 2024-12-12; CNBC, 2024-12-12)

Stated priorities

  • Safety after the 2023 close calls. The FAA and DOT held a Safety Summit on 2023-03-15, where Buttigieg cited an “uptick” in serious close calls. (Source: CNN, 2023-03-15) The Air Traffic Organization’s chief operating officer told staff on 2023-03-23: “There is no question that we are seeing too many close calls.” (Source: CNBC (Reuters), 2023-03-23) In April 2023 the FAA formed an independent National Airspace System (NAS) Safety Review Team after 10 incidents in late 2022 and early 2023. (Source: Government Executive, 2023-11-15)
  • Whitaker’s three risk areas (House testimony, 2024-02-06): serious safety events including close calls and runway incursions; the controller workforce, including fatigue and shortages; and continuous safety improvement. (Source: Whitaker prepared statement, 2024-02-06)
  • Controller hiring goals of 1,500 (FY2023), 1,800 (FY2024) and 2,000 (FY2025), with the FY2025 budget seeking $43 million to fill every Academy seat. (Source: FAA, 2025 Budget Proposal Invests in Aviation Safety, 2024-03-11; CNBC, 2024-03-11)
  • Facilities. The FY2025 budget proposed $8 billion over five years in mandatory funding to replace or modernize more than 20 facilities and 377 radar systems, starting with $1 billion in FY2025. Whitaker said 21 centers were 10 years past a 50-year design life. (Source: FAA, 2024-03-11; Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2024-03-11)
  • The administration’s own summary. DOT’s January 2025 overview calls the FY2024 hiring result “the first reversal of air traffic controller staffing since numbers began dropping in 2012” and says serious runway incidents fell from 11 in 2023 to one in 2024. These are the department’s claims; the sections below test them. (Source: DOT, Accomplishments Overview January 2021-January 2025)

Budget requests and appropriations

All figures are $ million. “Nominal” is the amount appropriated that year; “real” is the same amount in FY2026 dollars, CPI-U. “Total” is Operations, F&E, RE&D and the Airport Improvement Program obligation limit, plus any general-fund airport grants; it excludes the IIJA advance appropriations, shown separately below. The request columns are the President’s budget; the enacted columns are the FAA’s own record of appropriations. FY2020 is the start-year baseline and was enacted under President Trump, as was FY2021.

FY Request released Request total (nominal) F&E requested (nominal) Enacted (date, law) Enacted total, nominal Enacted total, real F&E enacted, nominal F&E enacted, real Operations, nominal Operations, real
2020 2019-03-11 (Trump) 17,105.0 3,295.0 2019-12-20, P.L. 116-94 (Trump) 17,617.7 22,584.1 3,045.0 3,903.4 10,630.0 13,626.6
2021 2020-02-10 (Trump) 17,521.5 3,000.0 2020-12-27, P.L. 116-260 (Trump) 17,964.5 22,286.8 3,015.0 3,740.4 11,001.5 13,648.5
2022 2021-04-09 overview; 2021-05-28 full 18,452.6 3,410.0 2022-03-15, P.L. 117-103 18,459.7 21,221.3 2,892.9 3,325.7 11,414.1 13,121.6
2023 2022-03-28 18,559.3 3,015.0 2022-12-29, P.L. 117-328 19,023.6 20,815.6 2,945.0 3,222.4 11,915.0 13,037.4
2024 2023-03-09 19,807.8 3,462.0 2024-03-09, P.L. 118-42 20,083.3 21,320.4 3,191.3 3,387.8 12,729.6 13,513.8
2025 2024-03-11 20,803.4 3,600.0 2025-03-15, P.L. 119-4 (full-year continuing resolution, after the term) 20,989.0 21,694.2 3,176.3 3,283.0 13,482.8 13,935.8

Sources: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification, Ten-Year Tables, 2026-04-03, as compiled in the series research; request release dates from CBO, GovInfo and CRS as recorded there. Real figures are computed with the BLS CPI-U fiscal-year deflator (series CUUR0000SA0, October to September averages; FY2026 averages 11 months because October 2025 was not published): 1.2819 (FY2020), 1.2406, 1.1496, 1.0942, 1.0616 (FY2024), 1.0336 (FY2025). CPI-U is a consumer-price index; the GDP price index is the usual alternative for federal spending and would give somewhat different real figures.

  • Nominal growth, real decline. From FY2020 to FY2024, enacted totals rose from $17,617.7 million to $20,083.3 million, +14.0 percent nominal, but fell from $22,584.1 million to $21,320.4 million in FY2026 dollars, -5.6 percent real. Operations rose 19.8 percent nominal and fell 0.8 percent real. F&E, the capital account, rose 4.8 percent nominal and fell 13.2 percent real ($3,903.4 million to $3,387.8 million in FY2026 dollars). Measured from FY2021 instead, totals rose 11.8 percent nominal and fell 4.3 percent real. (Computed from the table.)
  • With the infrastructure law’s facilities money. Adding the IIJA’s $1 billion a year for air traffic facilities (from FY2022), FAA capital funding rose from $3,903.4 million (FY2020) to $4,449.4 million (FY2024) in FY2026 dollars, +14.0 percent real (computed). That money was obligated slowly (see Pace of spending).
  • Congress gave more than requested overall, less for equipment. Enacted totals exceeded the request in each of FY2022 to FY2025, in part through general-fund airport grants the President did not request. But enacted F&E was below the request every year: by $517.1 million (FY2022), $70.0 million (FY2023), $270.8 million (FY2024) and $423.8 million (FY2025) (computed).
  • DOT’s own reading agrees. DOT’s May 2025 modernization plan says F&E “remained essentially flat at approximately $3 billion per year” for 15 years, losing about $1 billion in purchasing power. (Source: DOT/FAA, Brand New Air Traffic Control System Plan, May 2025) The NAS Safety Review Team put F&E at $3.0 billion in FY2019 and $2.95 billion in FY2023. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15)
  • The infrastructure law. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, P.L. 117-58), signed 2021-11-15, gave aviation $25 billion over FY2022 to FY2026: $15 billion for airport infrastructure grants, $5 billion for airport terminals and $5 billion for FAA air traffic facilities, in equal yearly installments. Congress set that split. (Source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification; Snopes, 2025-08-09) The facilities money cannot be used for radars, automation or communications systems. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15)
  • Pace of spending. The FAA announced the first $1 billion of the facilities money on 2022-04-27 (as Snopes relays it). As of 2025-09-30, eight months after the term, about $1.8 billion of the $4.0 billion appropriated for facilities (46 percent) had been obligated, against $7.6 billion of $12 billion (64 percent) in airport infrastructure grants and $3.8 billion of $4 billion (96 percent) in terminal grants. No figure for January 2025 was found. (Source: FAA FY2025 Agency Financial Report) In 2024 the FAA awarded 1,073 airport infrastructure grants worth $2.0 billion. (Source: DOT, FY2026 FAA Budget Estimates) The FAA opened the first $1 billion terminal grant round on 2022-02-25. (Source: Federal Register, 2022-02-25)
  • The $8 billion facilities proposal was not enacted in the FY2025 appropriation, which Congress passed as a full-year continuing resolution on 2025-03-15 with F&E at $3,176.3 million and no mandatory facilities line. (Source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification, Ten-Year Tables) Buttigieg’s spokesperson later said Republicans in Congress blocked it; the series research did not verify who blocked it. (Source: Snopes, 2025-08-09)
  • Authorization. The 2018 authorization expired at the end of FY2023 and was bridged with no lapse by four short extensions: P.L. 118-15 (to 2023-12-31), P.L. 118-34 (to 2024-03-08), P.L. 118-41 (to 2024-05-10) and P.L. 118-60 (to 2024-05-17). (Source: GovInfo, P.L. 118-15 and P.L. 118-34; CRS R49491, 2026-10-22) The Senate passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 by 88 to 4 on 2024-05-09 and the House by 387 to 26 on 2024-05-15; Biden signed it on 2024-05-16 (P.L. 118-63). (Source: Congress.gov, House hearing memo recording the votes; CRS IF12791, 2024-10-23)
  • No shutdown. The series research found no lapse in FAA appropriations between 2019-01-25 and 2025-10-01; every gap in the term was covered by continuing resolutions. (Source: CRS R49491, 2026-10-22)

Authorized levels under the 2024 Act ($ million; authorizations, not appropriations)

Account FY2024 FY2025 FY2026 FY2027 FY2028
Operations 12,730 13,055 13,354 13,650 13,954
Airport Improvement Program 3,350 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
Facilities and Equipment 3,191 3,575 3,625 3,675 3,725
Research, Engineering and Development 280 311 323 334 345
Total 19,551 20,941 21,302 21,659 22,024

Source: CRS IF12791, 2024-10-23.

Modernization: programs, contracts and progress

  • NextGen, the FAA’s long-running modernization program, made “mixed progress” since 2018, GAO found; its life-cycle cost estimate had not been updated since 2017, and the FAA reported about $14 billion spent on NextGen from FY2007 through FY2022 (a different base from the GAO and OIG totals cited in Part 1). (Source: GAO-24-105254, 2023-11-09) The OIG found the FAA’s statutory NextGen report incomplete and out of date: it claimed all major systems by 2025 when the plan was one location each, and left out spending after 2018. After cancelling the NAS Voice System contract, the FAA expected to pay $274 million to keep legacy voice systems running through 2030. (Source: DOT OIG AV2024023, 2024-04-30)
  • Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM). The OIG reported in July 2024 that this almost $1 billion program to digitize tower flight data was nearly three years late, and that cost growth of about 20 percent since its 2016 baseline had led the FAA to cut deployment from 89 to 49 sites. (Source: DOT OIG AV2024031, 2024-07-17)
  • Data Communications. The en route segment’s completion date moved from December 2023 to July 2027, a 43-month delay, with cost up $16.7 million (4.0 percent) against its baseline, per the FAA’s FY2027 capital plan. (Source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification, Capital Investment Plan, 2026-04-03, read from an image table) The OIG measures it differently: it attributes a 51-month delay and $41 million (5 percent) of cost growth to COVID-19, plus $7 million to the government shutdowns. (Source: DOT OIG, FAA NextGen External Factors, 2025-07-23)
  • Which term owns the slips. The series counts a program slip against the term in which it was announced or re-baselined. The research record does not give the date of either program’s re-baseline, and the OIG traces part of both slips to COVID-19, which began before this term. Neither slip is counted in this part’s modernization rating; both are cross-term facts.
  • Aging systems. After the January 2023 NOTAM outage, the FAA assessed all 138 of its air traffic control systems. GAO reported that 51 (37 percent) were unsustainable and 54 (39 percent) potentially unsustainable; 58 of those 105 had critical operational impact; 17 were “especially concerning,” with replacements at least six years away and in some cases 10 to 13; four critical systems had no modernization investment. GAO called modernization slow and said FAA actions were “urgently needed.” Seven recommendations. (Source: GAO-24-107001, 2024-09-23; GAO-25-107917, 2024-12-12)
  • Facilities. En route center buildings were 56 to 64 years old with “no current plan or budget to replace any of them”; TRACONs averaged 36 years; 280 terminal radars were 25 to 50 years old; the FAA estimated a $5.3 billion backlog of components past their service life. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15) The FY2025 request cited a $5.2 billion sustainment backlog. (Source: DOT, FY2025 President’s Budget Submission (FAA))
  • NOTAM. The Notice to Air Missions system, which sends safety notices to pilots, failed on 2023-01-11 (see Safety and performance). Its legacy half ran on “30-year-old software and architecture”; a replacement mandated by Congress in 2012 and 2018 was due mostly by mid-2025. (Source: DOT, Nolen testimony to Senate Commerce, 2023-02-15) The new system, built by CGI Federal, began operating in September 2025, after the term. (Source: FAA, What is a NOTAM?)
  • Telecommunications. In March 2023 the FAA chose Verizon for the FAA Enterprise Network Services (FENS) program, a 15-year contract valued at $2.4 billion with options, to replace the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure network (held by L3Harris) and move off copper-wire and older digital circuits. (Source: Verizon release via Stock Titan, 2023-03-31; SAM.gov FENS notice; Washington Technology, March 2023)

Major contracts and programs active during the term

Program Award Vendor Value as reported Status at term end Source
FAA Enterprise Network Services (FENS) Announced 2023-03-31 Verizon Business Network Services $2.4 billion with options, 15 years Transition from the L3Harris network under way Verizon release, 2023-03-31; SAM.gov
Terminal Flight Data Manager 2016 (before the term) Leidos (prime, per OIG) Program almost $1 billion Deploying; cut to 49 sites DOT OIG AV2024031, 2024-07-17
NOTAM modernization Under 2012 and 2018 mandates; replacement contract to CGI Federal in 2025 CGI Federal (replacement) Not stated for the term Legacy system still in use Nolen testimony, 2023-02-15; FAA, What is a NOTAM?
IIJA air traffic facilities Program, FY2022 to FY2026 Various $5 billion $1.8 billion of $4.0 billion obligated by 2025-09-30 FAA FY2025 Agency Financial Report

Contract obligations by award could not be retrieved for this series (the USAspending query tool failed).

Staffing

FY (September) Controllers at facilities CPCs Trainees (CPC-IT + developmentals) Hires (goal) Losses FAA target or range
2020 (before term) 13,830 10,268 3,562 920 (910) n/a Range 11,296 to 13,801
2021 13,715 10,580 3,135 510 (cut from 910 to 500) 901 Range kept at 2020 levels
2022 13,418 10,578 2,840 1,026 (1,020) n/a n/a
2023 13,448 10,593 2,855 1,512 (1,500) n/a Staffing standard 12,242; collaborative target 14,633
2024 13,774 10,730 3,044 1,811 (1,800) 1,400 Collaborative target 14,633
2025 (after term) 14,223 10,693 3,530 2,028 (2,000, set in 2024) 1,460 12,563 (new model, 2026)

Sources: FY2020 to FY2022 from the NAS Safety Review Team report, Figure 5 (FAA Finance staffing data), 2023-11-15; FY2023 from the FAA Controller Workforce Plan FY2024 appendix; FY2024 from the Controller Workforce Plan 2025-2028 (posted 2025-08-21); FY2025 from the Controller Workforce Plan 2026-2028; FY2021 losses and the 2021 range from the Controller Workforce Plan 2022-2031. Trainee totals are computed. The “collaborative target” is the CPC target the FAA and the controllers’ union (NATCA) developed jointly; the 2026 target uses a different method and is not comparable.

  • Certified controllers. CPCs rose from 10,268 (FY2020) to 10,730 (FY2024), +462 or +4.5 percent; within the term, from FY2021 (10,580), the rise was +150 or +1.4 percent (computed). Most of the turn came in FY2021, which began four months before the term, while trainees from earlier years certified. In FY2012 there had been 11,753 CPCs, so FY2024 was still 1,023 (8.7 percent) lower (computed). Against the collaborative target, CPCs were 3,903 short in FY2024. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report; FAA Controller Workforce Plans, as above)
  • Total controllers at facilities fell from 13,830 (FY2020) to a low of 13,418 (FY2022), then rose to 13,774 (FY2024), a net change of -56 (-0.4 percent). Trainees fell from 3,562 to 3,044 (-14.5 percent) over the same years (computed).
  • Hiring. Hires fell to 510 in FY2021, under a pandemic goal of 500 set before the term, then rose every year to 1,811 in FY2024. Against the FY2020 base (920 hires), FY2024 is about twice as many. Against the pre-pandemic years it is about the same level: 1,880 hires in FY2017 and 1,786 in FY2018. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, Figure 5, FAA Finance staffing data; FAA Controller Workforce Plan 2025-2028) GAO found the FAA “increased hiring … to a large extent every year since 2021.” (Source: GAO-26-107320, 2025-12-17)
  • The FAA’s “largest in nearly a decade” claim. The FAA said FY2024’s 1,811 hires were the largest number in nearly a decade. (Source: FAA, FAA Hits Air Traffic Controller Hiring Goal, 2024-09-23) The FAA’s own staffing data contradict it: FY2017’s 1,880 hires, seven years earlier, were higher.
  • DOT’s “first reversal” claim. DOT called the FY2024 result “the first reversal of air traffic controller staffing since numbers began dropping in 2012.” The CPC count did turn up, but in FY2021 (10,268 to 10,580), not FY2024, and total controllers at facilities did not regain their FY2020 level during the term.
  • But goals followed training capacity, not need. The National Academies found the FY2023 goal of 1,500 “insufficient to make up for net losses of previous years.” It reported FY2023’s 1,512 hires as “1,511 below modeled estimates of needed hiring,” and gave the unconstrained estimate of need as 3,043. Those two figures do not reconcile (3,043 minus 1,512 is 1,531), and the report does not explain the difference of 20. (Source: National Academies, 2025-06-18) The Safety Review Team said the 1,500 and 1,800 goals were “aligned primarily on FAA Academy throughput versus the actual needs of the system” and would net “fewer than 200 air traffic controllers by 2032.” It also found overtime “at a historically high level and increasing” and an Academy failure rate of “just over 30 percent.” (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15)
  • Critical facilities. As of March 2022, 20 of 26 critical facilities (77 percent) were below the FAA’s own 85 percent staffing threshold; New York TRACON was at 54 percent and Miami Tower at 66 percent. (Source: DOT OIG AV2023035, 2023-06-21) Jacksonville Center logged more than 300 “staffing triggers” (cases where traffic was cut for lack of controllers). (Source: DOT OIG, FY2024 Top Management Challenges, 2023-11-01)
  • Recruiting pipelines narrowed. Applications from experienced controllers fell 71 percent from 2019 to the latest year GAO reviewed (its report does not name that year in the material read; it was published 2025-12-17), and the share of hires from college training programs fell from about 25 percent (FY2019) to about 15 percent (FY2023). GAO found the FAA had no performance goals for recruiting, hiring or training. (Source: GAO-26-107320, 2025-12-17)
  • Responses during the term. On 2023-11-17 the FAA announced a year-round hiring track for experienced controllers, full Academy classes, new advanced-training sites and tower simulators at 95 facilities by December 2025. (Source: FAA, 2023-11-17) It granted staffing-related scheduling relief at DCA, JFK, LaGuardia and Newark on 2023-09-20 (88 Fed. Reg. 64793) and announced new rest rules for controllers on 2024-04-19. (Source: House T&I hearing memo, 2024-02-06; CNBC, 2024-04-19) Section 437 of the 2024 Act set each year’s minimum hiring target for FY2024 to FY2028 at the most the Academy can train, subject to appropriations. (Source: H.R. 3935 text, sec. 437)
  • Newark airspace. On 2024-03-20 the FAA and NATCA agreed to move control of Newark-area airspace from the understaffed New York TRACON to Philadelphia; the move took place in July 2024. (Source: Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2024-03-20; DOT OIG, 2025-07-28) Accounts of how many controllers moved conflict: CNBC says 17 were required to move; the Reason Foundation says 14 volunteered and 10 were temporarily reassigned. (Source: CNBC, 2025-08-08; Reason Foundation)
  • Definitions matter. The facility totals include trainees; only the CPC column counts fully certified controllers. GAO reports 13,164 controllers at end FY2025 where the FAA’s own appendix gives 14,223 on what appears to be the same definition; the gap is unexplained. This article uses the FAA’s series. (Source: GAO-26-107320; FAA Controller Workforce Plan 2026-2028)

What the overseers found

Date Body Finding Recommendations
2021-02-23 DOT OIG (AV2021020) 737 MAX certification followed process, but FAA guidance and ODA oversight had gaps 14; FAA concurred with all
2021-03-30 DOT OIG “NextGen Benefits Have Not Kept Pace With Initial Projections” (title and date only) n/a
2022-01-12 DOT OIG Changes in requirements and delays contributed to termination of the NAS Voice System contract (title and date only) n/a
2022-06-30 GAO (GAO-22-104480) U.S. and European certification largely similar; FAA does not customarily independently review a manufacturer’s technical basis for compliance none listed
2023-01-11 DOT OIG FAA validated its Air Traffic Skills Assessment test but “Lacks a Plan To Evaluate Its Effectiveness” (title and date only) n/a
2023-02-15 Senate Commerce Hearing on the NOTAM failure; Nolen testified n/a
2023-04-26 DOT OIG (AV2023025) 737 MAX return to service complete; room to improve risk assessment and certification count not captured
2023-06-21 DOT OIG (AV2023035) 20 of 26 critical facilities below 85 percent staffing 2
2023-11-09 GAO (GAO-24-105254) NextGen “mixed progress”; cost estimate stale since 2017 4
2023-11-15 NAS Safety Review Team Erosion of safety margins “rendering the current level of safety unsustainable” 24; 5 implemented by October 2024
2024-04-30 DOT OIG (AV2024023) FAA’s NextGen report incomplete and out of date 3
2024-06-06 NTSB Austin near collision: controller’s faulty assumption; pilots contributed 7 new to FAA, 5 reiterated
2024-07-17 DOT OIG (AV2024031) TFDM late, over cost, cut to 49 sites 3
2024-09-23 GAO (GAO-24-107001) 51 of 138 systems unsustainable; action “urgently needed” 7
2024-10-09 DOT OIG (AV2025002) FAA oversight of Boeing 737 and 787 production “not effective” 16

Sources: each body’s report on the date shown; the Safety Review Team implementation count is from DOT OIG AV2025026, 2025-03-12; the Austin finding is from NTSB DCA23FA149, 2024-06-06.

  • The Safety Review Team’s balance. The same report that found safety margins eroding said the early-2023 incidents “do not represent an overall increase in incidents over the last five years,” that the Air Traffic Organization “operates a robust and well-functioning Safety Management System,” and that “This is not to say that the system is unsafe; however, system efficiency is suffering and funding challenges are eroding the margin of safety.” (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report, 2023-11-15)
  • The Boeing production audit (OIG). Requested by the bipartisan leaders of the House and Senate aviation committees, the OIG found the FAA did not use data to target audits, could not track repeated noncompliance, had no criteria for taking back authority delegated to Boeing, and had left 15 of 34 reviewed undue-pressure allegations unresolved for more than a year. (Source: DOT OIG AV2025002, 2024-10-09)
  • Congress. Whitaker told Senate Commerce on 2024-06-13 that “the FAA should have had much better visibility into what was happening at Boeing before January 5th.” (Source: S. Hrg. 118-730, 2024-06-13) A House aviation subcommittee examined Boeing’s action plan with him on 2024-09-24. (Source: House T&I Democrats, hearing page, 2024-09-24) On 2024-12-12 Sen. Maria Cantwell said she was “saddened and surprised” by his planned departure. (Source: Senate Commerce, Cantwell remarks, 2024-12-12)
  • Open recommendations after the term. In testimony on 2025-05-15, four months after the term, GAO counted 50 open recommendations to the FAA from reports issued since 2020. (Source: GAO-25-108502, 2025-05-15) GAO’s June 2025 letter on priority recommendations counts 20 priority open recommendations to DOT as a whole as of June 2024. (Source: GAO-25-108054) Of the OIG’s more than 200 NextGen recommendations from 2005 to 2022, all but 3 had been closed by April 2024. (Source: DOT OIG AV2024023, 2024-04-30)

Safety and performance over the term

Runway incursions (fiscal years)

FY Total Category A Category B Serious (A+B)
2019 1,753 3 9 12
2020 1,261 4 11 15
2021 1,574 6 12 18
2022 1,730 6 10 16
2023 1,760 9 13 22
2024 1,758 2 7 9

Source: DOT OIG AV2025026, 2025-03-12, Figures 1 and 2 (read from chart labels); FAA regional runway safety pages for FY2019 to FY2021.

  • Counts. Serious incursions went from 15 (FY2020) to 9 (FY2024); within the term they rose to 22 in FY2023 and then fell 59 percent to 9, the lowest of the six years in the table. Total incursions rose from 1,261 (FY2020, a pandemic year) to 1,758 (FY2024) as traffic recovered; from FY2021 the rise was 11.7 percent (computed). (Source: DOT OIG AV2025026, 2025-03-12) These are small counts: a change of a few events moves them a lot.
  • Rates per operation. Traffic fell sharply in FY2020 and FY2021, so counts across the term mislead. No serious-incursion rate per operation exists on one basis for FY2020 and FY2024: in FY2019 the FAA replaced that rate with a weighted surface risk index. (Source: FAA FY2019 Performance and Accountability Report) The rates that do exist are these. The Air Traffic Organization’s chief operating officer put all runway incursions at about 33 per million takeoffs and landings in FY2022 and 32 in FY2023. (Source: FAA, Arel testimony to Senate Commerce, 2023) CNN’s May 2025 review of FAA data says the rate per million operations “has remained consistent over the last decade.” (Source: CNN, May 2025) The FAA reported that the serious-incursion rate per million operations fell 74 percent, from 0.47 to 0.12, between January-July 2023 and January-July 2024. (Source: FAA General Statements, 2024)
  • Other counts disagree. DOT’s January 2025 summary says serious runway incidents fell from 11 (2023) to one (2024); CNN counts 1,837 incursions in 2023 and 1,664 in 2024, with Category A events at 6 and 2. These use different periods and definitions from the OIG table. (Source: DOT, Accomplishments Overview; CNN, May 2025)
  • Early 2023 in context. Reuters reported that the incursion rate peaked at 33 per million takeoffs and landings in March 2023 and fell to 19 in April. (Source: Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2023-05-24) That March peak equals the FAA’s figure for FY2022 as a whole.
  • Serious near-collision reporting. A New York Times analysis of internal FAA records found 503 air traffic lapses rated “significant” in FY2023, 65 percent more than in FY2022, while traffic rose about 4 percent. (Source: New York Times, 2025-01-31) No count on the same basis was found for FY2020 or FY2024, so this indicator is not available across the term.
  • Individual events. At JFK on 2023-01-13 an American 777 crossed a runway in front of a departing Delta 737. At Austin on 2023-02-04 a FedEx 767 aborted its landing as a Southwest 737 took off beneath it, with less than 200 feet of separation; the NTSB found a controller’s faulty assumption caused the loss of separation and that the Southwest crew contributed. (Source: Business Insider; NTSB, 2024-06-06)

Losses of standard separation (en route centers) and Core 30 airport incursions

Measure FY2017-19 average FY2021-23 average FY2023 FY2024
Losses of standard separation, all en route centers 1,221 904 1,026 679
Runway incursions, 30 busiest airports 391 308 362 345

Source: FAA Air Traffic Organization, Air Traffic by the Numbers FY2024 (read from rendered pages). Losses of standard separation fell 33.8 percent from FY2023 to FY2024 (computed).

  • Fatalities. The FAA’s commercial air carrier fatality rate was 0.72 per 100 million persons on board in FY2020, 0.1 in FY2023 and 0.01 in FY2024, against ceilings of 5.7 (FY2020) and 4.7 (FY2024). The FY2021 and FY2022 results were not read, and the sources do not identify the events behind the small nonzero rates. (Source: FAA FY2020 Performance and Accountability Report summary; FAA FY2024 Performance and Accountability Report) Press reviews in 2023 found no fatal U.S. passenger-airline crash since 2009. (Source: Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2023-05-24; Business Insider, August 2023) No source read reports one later in the term. The NTSB’s own Part 121 accident and fatality counts for calendar 2021 to 2024 are published only as spreadsheets this series could not read, so they are not used here, and the safety rating does not rest on them.
  • The Alaska Airlines door plug. On 2024-01-05 a door plug blew out of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, a Boeing 737-9 MAX. The FAA grounded 171 aircraft on 2024-01-06. (Source: FAA, Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft) Its response is under Boeing below.
  • The NOTAM outage. Nolen ordered a nationwide ground stop at about 7:15 a.m. on 2023-01-11 and lifted it at 9:07 a.m.; the FAA then added a synchronization delay and a two-person rule. (Source: DOT, Nolen testimony, 2023-02-15) The FAA’s preliminary finding: “contract personnel unintentionally deleted files while working to correct synchronization between the live primary database and a backup database,” with no evidence of a cyberattack. (Source: FAA NOTAM Statement, 2023-01-19) The FAA’s statement did not name the firm; in January 2023 The Hill, citing the Washington Post, reported that the contractor was Spatial Front. (Source: The Hill, January 2023) Counts of affected flights differ: 32,578 delayed (Safety Review Team) against about 1,300 cancelled and nearly 10,000 delayed (a 2024 GAO review, as FedScoop relays it). (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report; FedScoop)

Airline on-time and cancellation rates (calendar years)

Year On-time arrivals Cancelled
2019 79.0% 1.9%
2020 84.5% 6.0%
2021 81.1% 1.76%
2022 76.72% 2.71%
2023 78.34% 1.3%
2024 78.10% 1.4%

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), Air Travel Consumer Reports, December editions for each year. Rates are shares of scheduled domestic flights by the reporting carriers. The 2023 cancellation rate is the 1.3 percent the 2024 release gives on the same basis as 2024; the 2023 release itself gave 1.29 percent for the 10 largest airlines and “under 1.2%” across the system, “the lowest in over a decade.”

  • Start-year to end-year. From 2020 to 2024, on-time arrivals fell 6.4 percentage points and cancellations fell 4.6 points, but both 2020 rates were distorted by the pandemic collapse in traffic. Against 2019, the last normal year, 2024 was 0.9 points lower on time and 0.5 points lower in cancellations; against 2021, 3.0 points lower on time and 0.36 points lower in cancellations (computed). The share of delays attributable to the air traffic system was not available in the BTS releases read.
  • The Southwest meltdown. BTS attributes most of December 2022’s cancellations to one airline: 5.4 percent of scheduled flights were cancelled, 54.51 percent of them Southwest’s, and Southwest cancelled 14,042 flights from December 24 to 31. (Source: BTS, December 2022) DOT’s response was a consumer-protection case, not an FAA action. (Source: DOT, 2023-12-18)

Boeing and manufacturer oversight after Alaska 1282

  • 2024-01-24: the FAA said it “will not grant any production expansion of the MAX” and expanded on-site oversight. Whitaker: “This won’t be back to business as usual for Boeing.” (Source: FAA, 2024-01-24) CNBC reported the cap as 38 aircraft a month; the FAA’s own release gives no number. (Source: CNBC, 2024-11-07)
  • 2024-02-28: Whitaker gave Boeing 90 days to produce a comprehensive action plan; Boeing delivered it on 2024-05-30. (Source: FAA, Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft; S. Hrg. 118-730, 2024-06-13)
  • March 2024: the FAA’s six-week audit found noncompliance in manufacturing process control, parts handling and storage, and product control. (Source: FAA, Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft) The New York Times, reviewing an FAA presentation, reported that Boeing failed 33 of 89 product audits and Spirit AeroSystems 7 of 13. (Source: CNBC citing the New York Times, 2024-03-12)
  • The expert panel required by the 2020 law reported on 2024-02-26; the FAA agreed with all 53 of its recommendations (44 to Boeing, 7 to the FAA, 2 joint). (Source: FAA, Review Panel’s Final Report on ODA)
  • DOT says the FAA “doubled the number of inspectors responsible for overseeing Boeing and its suppliers” (the department’s claim). The FAA’s total aviation safety inspector count was 4,175 at end FY2020 and about 4,184 at end FY2024 (derived from that year’s hires and losses). On the workforce plans’ table of non-supervisory inspectors, the count fell from 2,952 (FY2023) to 2,823 (FY2024), -4.4 percent. (Source: DOT, Accomplishments Overview; FAA Aviation Safety Workforce Plans)
  • The NTSB later found that the FAA “was ineffective in ensuring Boeing addressed ‘repetitive and systemic’ nonconformance issues”; the plug had been opened without documentation at Boeing’s Renton factory on 2023-09-18. (Source: NTSB, 2025-06-24)

Assessing the criticisms of Secretary Buttigieg

Analysis: this subsection is interpretation, not reporting. It sits here, rather than in Team’s Take, so each verdict stays next to the record it weighs.

How this section works. The Secretary of Transportation oversees the FAA; the Administrator runs it; the White House nominates Administrators and the Senate confirms them; Congress sets the money. Each criticism gives the claim in its strongest form and who made it, the response, the independent record (figures sourced in the sections above unless cited here), and a verdict: supported, partly supported, not supported or unresolvable. Buttigieg’s own claims get the same test. The verdicts are this article’s reading of the record.

C1. The FAA went about 19 months without a confirmed leader, and the first nominee was not qualified.

  • Claim. Sen. Cruz, 2023-03-25: Washington “lacked the aviation experience necessary to run the FAA.” Cruz and Rep. Graves, 2023-03-02: Washington failed the statute’s “civilian” and aviation-experience tests. (Source: Eno Center, 2023-03-26; Graves and Cruz letter, 2023-03-02)
  • Response. Buttigieg, 2023-03-25: “The FAA needs a confirmed Administrator, and Phil Washington’s transportation & military experience made him an excellent nominee.” (Source: Politico, 2023-03-26)
  • Record. The vacancy ran 573 days, 39.2 percent of the term, through the early-2023 close calls and the NOTAM outage. Senators in both parties raised concerns and the committee never voted; Congress later barred retired military officers by law. The second nominee came 166 days after the first withdrawal was announced and was confirmed 98 to 0. The White House nominates and the Senate confirms.
  • Verdict. Partly supported. The vacancy and the eligibility doubts are documented; the record does not make the vacancy Buttigieg’s decision alone. His defense of the nominee runs against the bar on retired military officers that Congress later enacted. Washington’s experience running Denver International Airport arguably met the aviation-experience test, which the sources do not settle.

C2. “Mayor Pete failed for four years to address the air traffic controller shortage.”

  • Claim. Secretary Sean Duffy on X, 2025-02-17. (Source: Fox News, 2025-02-18)
  • Response. Buttigieg, 2026-11-16: “We reversed a decade of decline in air traffic controller staffing.” His spokesperson, 2025-08-20: the FAA “reversed years of staffing declines, meeting an aggressive hiring goal last year.” (Source: Buttigieg on X, 2026-11-16; Fox News, 2025-08-20)
  • Record. The same two bases apply to both sides. Hiring: from the pandemic year it rose more than threefold (510 in FY2021 to 1,811 in FY2024); from the FY2020 start-year it about doubled (920 to 1,811); against the pre-pandemic years it returned to roughly the same level (1,880 in FY2017, 1,786 in FY2018). Certified controllers: +4.5 percent from FY2020 (10,268 to 10,730), but +1.4 percent within the term (10,580 in FY2021 to 10,730), and most of the turn came in FY2021. Total controllers at facilities stayed below the FY2020 level (13,774 against 13,830), trainees fell 14.5 percent, goals followed Academy capacity rather than need, and CPCs ended 3,903 below the collaborative target.
  • Verdict. Duffy’s claim is partly supported. The shortage was not closed, hiring only returned to its pre-pandemic level, and certified controllers barely grew within the term. “Failed … to address” overstates it, because hiring rose in every year of the term and Congress and the FAA set a hiring floor at Academy capacity. Buttigieg’s claim to have “reversed a decade of decline” is also partly supported. The certified count did turn up after FY2020, by 4.5 percent (1.4 percent within the term), but total controllers did not, and hiring regained rather than exceeded its FY2017 level.

C3. Diversity hiring degraded air traffic control and may have contributed to the 2025-01-29 collision near Reagan National Airport.

  • Claim. President Trump, 2025-01-30, asked whether diversity hiring caused the crash: “It just could have been”; he also said Buttigieg had run the FAA “right into the ground with his diversity.” The same day he said the FAA website listed “severe intellectual disability, psychiatric disability” among targeted disabilities and “They can be air traffic controllers.” (Source: NBC News, 2025-01-30; Mother Jones, January 2025; BBC Verify, 2025-01-31) Duffy, 2025-08-13, and DOT, 2025-08-20: the Biden DOT removed the “Best Qualified” tier for Academy applicants (a score of 85 or above on the Air Traffic Skills Assessment) in favor of an 80-and-above “Well Qualified” tier, citing a 2023 internal presentation, and raised washout rates. (Source: New York Post, 2025-08-13; Fox News, 2025-08-20)
  • Response. Buttigieg, 2025: “we did not change the rigorous standard for becoming a certified air traffic controller.” His spokesperson: the assessment “has nothing to do with the standards of becoming a certified ATC … that test hasn’t changed.” (Source: Fox News, 2025-08-20)
  • Record. The NTSB’s final report names the FAA’s placement of a helicopter route near a runway approach path, its failure to act on route data and earlier recommendations, overreliance on visual separation, controller workload and an Army altimeter issue; its chair said “the conditions for this tragedy were in place long before the night of Jan. 29.” Finding 10 reads in full: “Although the [DCA] air traffic control tower facility was not staffed to its target level at the time of the accident, the number of staff in the tower at the time of the accident was adequate and in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration directives.” The NTSB also named as a contributing factor “an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time,” and found (Finding 66) that the Air Traffic Organization “was made aware of, and had multiple opportunities to identify, the risk” and failed to mitigate it. Those conditions built up over years that include 2021 to 2025. A full-text search of the report by this series’ research found no finding, cause or recommendation about hiring policy. (Source: NTSB, 2026-01-27; NTSB AIR-26-02, 2026-02-17) The disability-hiring page Trump cited had been online since at least 2013, including through his first term. (Source: FactCheck.org, 2025-01-31; BBC Verify, 2025-01-31) GAO found the controller workforce’s makeup “did not change substantially” from 2017 to 2023. (Source: GAO-26-107320, 2025-12-17) The 2014 controller “biographical assessment,” litigated as Brigida v. United States Department of Transportation (D.D.C. No. 1:16-cv-02227), predates Buttigieg by seven years; an OIG investigation of it, dated 2016-08-09, found its findings “did not warrant a referral to a federal prosecutor.” (Source: Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse; DOT OIG I15E012SINV) The 2023 tier presentation has not been published, and the Safety Review Team had reported an Academy failure rate of “just over 30 percent” in 2023.
  • Verdict. That diversity hiring contributed to the collision: not supported. That the disability page showed a plan to hire unfit controllers (Trump, 2025-01-30): not supported. That the Biden DOT lowered the top referral tier and so raised washouts: unresolvable on the public record. The two sides describe different thresholds (an Academy referral tier versus the certification standard), and no causal link to washout rates is documented.

C4. Buttigieg left a “broken system” and made “zero progress” modernizing it despite the money.

  • Claim. Duffy, 2025-05-06: “They knew we had an old system. They saw the GAO report saying it was about to fail.” Duffy, 2026-11-13: “$15 billion has been given to the FAA to fix this air traffic control system … barely anything was done.” Trump, 2026-11-16: “Buttigieg ruined the system. He totally ruined it.” TKO chief executive Ari Emanuel, 2026-11-13: “you had four years in the job and infrastructure money, yet made zero progress modernizing the FAA.” A New York Post report of 2025-07-21 said DOT spent more than $80 billion on “DEI grants” while delaying upgrades. (Source: Fox News, 2025-05-06; TheWrap, 2026-11-13; The Hill, 2026-11-16; Snopes, 2025-08-09)
  • Response. Buttigieg, 2026-11-13: “We did a lot to upgrade the system.” On 2026-11-16 he said he “launched a project to transition the FAA’s communications system from copper wire to a modern network,” that the current administration had “failed to explain why their execution of it triggered the worst FAA communications breakdown this century,” and that he supported “more funding for FAA upgrades.” (Source: TheWrap, 2026-11-13; Buttigieg on X, 2026-11-16)
  • Record. The 51 unsustainable systems and the slow pace (TFDM, Data Communications) are documented. So is the age of the problem: the Safety Review Team traced it to “inadequate, inconsistent reinvestment in legacy systems” (as quoted by the Reason Foundation), and DOT’s own 2025 plan says F&E was flat near $3 billion for 15 years. In FY2026 dollars, annual F&E fell 13.2 percent from FY2020 to FY2024; with the IIJA’s $1 billion a year for facilities, capital funding rose 14.0 percent, but less than half of that money was obligated by September 2025. Congress set the IIJA split, limited the facilities money to buildings and enacted less F&E than requested in each of FY2022 to FY2025. Work did start in the term: the FENS award, NOTAM replacement and facilities grants. The sources do not show what Duffy’s “$15 billion” comprises; the largest air traffic appropriation, $12.5 billion (P.L. 119-21), was enacted on 2025-07-04, after Buttigieg left. Snopes could not substantiate the “$80 billion DEI” figure and found the air traffic money and the “Justice40” programs were separate pools, none of the latter for air travel. (Source: NAS Safety Review Team report; DOT/FAA, May 2025; Snopes, 2025-08-09) The 2026-11-13 failure came during L3Harris router work under the older network contract; its cause is under investigation. (Source: Newsweek; NOTUS, 2026-11-14)
  • Verdict. That the system was old, known to be failing and slow to modernize on his watch: supported. That he “ruined” it or made “zero progress”: not supported. The “$80 billion DEI” claim: not supported. Duffy’s “$15 billion … barely anything was done”: unresolvable as stated, because its basis is not shown. Buttigieg’s claim that he launched the copper-to-fiber transition: partly supported (FENS was awarded in his term; when the conversion work began is not documented). His claim that the current administration’s “execution” triggered the 2026 outage: unresolvable until the investigation reports. His spokesperson’s claim that Republicans blocked the $8 billion request: unresolvable on the sources read.

C5. The January 2023 NOTAM ground stop showed he neglected the system.

  • Claim. Fox News opinion column, 2026-11-17: the outage was “one of many signals that our decrepit air traffic system needed repair — repair that Buttigieg neglected to provide.” (Source: Fox News, opinion, 2026-11-17)
  • Response. Buttigieg on 2023-01-11, as the ground stop lifted: “I have directed an after-action process to determine root causes and recommend next steps.” (Source: NPR, 2023-01-11)
  • Record. The proximate cause was a contractor deleting files during a database fix, which the FAA addressed with procedural changes. The legacy software was about 30 years old and its replacement, mandated by Congress in 2012 and 2018, was under way before the term and went live in September 2025.
  • Verdict. Partly supported. The old software and slow replacement are documented; “neglected” is not, because the replacement program predates him and continued.

C6. FAA oversight of Boeing was lax before the Alaska 1282 accident.

  • Claim. The strongest form comes from the overseers, not from a named political critic: the NTSB found the FAA “was ineffective” in making Boeing fix systemic nonconformance, and the OIG found its oversight of Boeing production “not effective.” (Source: NTSB, 2025-06-24; DOT OIG AV2025002, 2024-10-09) The series research found no critic who named Buttigieg personally on Boeing.
  • Response. Whitaker conceded the FAA “should have had much better visibility” before the accident. After it, the FAA capped MAX production, audited Boeing and Spirit, required an action plan and accepted all 53 panel recommendations. House T&I Democrats Rick Larsen and Steve Cohen praised the FAA’s “prompt response.” (Source: S. Hrg. 118-730, 2024-06-13; House T&I Democrats statement)
  • Record. The ineffective oversight is documented, and it spans the delegation system and earlier administrations (the OIG flagged ODA oversight gaps in February 2021). The post-accident response is also documented.
  • Verdict. Partly supported. Pre-accident oversight failed, on findings that cover years before and during the term; the response after the accident was strong.

C7. Biden-era decisions at Newark caused the 2025 outages.

  • Claim. Duffy on X, May 2025: “Biden and Buttigieg ignored the warning signs at Newark. They neglected the air traffic control system. They failed to fix the problems.” (Source: Duffy on X, May 2025)
  • Response. No Buttigieg statement defending the 2024 relocation was found.
  • Record. The FAA and NATCA moved Newark approach control to Philadelphia in 2024 to relieve New York TRACON, staffed at 54 percent. On 2025-04-28 Philadelphia controllers lost radar and communications for about 90 seconds in what the FAA called “a telecommunications issue,” and some controllers then took leave. The OIG opened an audit of the relocation’s planning and risk assessment on 2025-07-28, at the request of Secretary Duffy; no results were public in the sources read. (Source: DOT OIG, 2025-07-28; CNBC, 2025-05-09)
  • Verdict. Unresolvable until the OIG reports. The relocation’s staffing rationale is documented; a causal link to the outages is not.

C8. Other charges: paternity leave and the Southwest meltdown.

  • Record. Fox host Tucker Carlson mocked Buttigieg’s 2021 parental leave during a supply-chain monologue; Buttigieg said he had been “available 24/7 on issues that can’t wait.” (Source: Business Insider, October 2021) No aviation event tied to the leave was found. BTS attributes most of the December 2022 cancellations to Southwest; DOT fined Southwest $35 million within a $140 million settlement, the largest it has imposed on an airline for consumer violations, and on 2024-04-24 announced rules requiring automatic cash refunds. (Source: AP via Yahoo Finance, 2023-12-18; DOT, 2024-04-24)
  • Verdict. As criticisms of his FAA oversight: not supported.

D1. Buttigieg’s own safety claims.

  • Claim. 2025-01-30: “We put safety first, drove down close calls, grew Air Traffic Control, and had zero commercial airline crash fatalities out of millions of flights on our watch.” 2026-11-16: his team “drove down runway safety incidents” and had the “lowest flight cancellation rates in years.” (Source: CNBC, 2025-01-30; Buttigieg on X, 2026-11-16)
  • Record. Reuters (2023-05-24) and Business Insider (August 2023) found no fatal U.S. passenger-airline crash since 2009, and no source read reports one later in the term; but the series could not read the NTSB’s accident tables for 2021 to 2024, and the FAA’s commercial fatality rate was near zero, not zero, in FY2023 and FY2024, for events the sources do not identify. Serious runway incursions rose from 15 (FY2020) to 22 (FY2023) and fell to 9 (FY2024); the FAA’s serious-incursion rate per operation fell sharply from 2023 to 2024, but the rate for all incursions was about 32 to 33 per million operations in FY2022 and FY2023, and CNN found it flat over a decade. The 2023 cancellation rate was the lowest in over a decade, per BTS. The collision near Reagan National came nine days after he left. The NTSB said its conditions had been in place “long before,” which includes his four years: an arrival rate that “regularly strained” the tower and risks the FAA “had multiple opportunities to identify.”
  • Verdict. “Zero commercial airline crash fatalities”: partly supported (not contradicted by any source read, confirmed only to mid-2023). “Drove down runway safety incidents”: partly supported (serious events fell at the end of the term after rising in its middle; the per-operation rate for all incursions did not fall). “Lowest flight cancellation rates in years”: supported for 2023.

Verdicts at a glance

# Statement Who Verdict
C1 Leadership vacancy and an unqualified first nominee Cruz, Graves Partly supported
C2 “Failed for four years” on staffing Duffy Partly supported
C2 “Reversed a decade of decline” Buttigieg Partly supported
C3 Diversity hiring contributed to the DCA collision Trump Not supported
C3 Referral tier lowered and washouts rose Duffy, DOT Unresolvable
C4 Old, failing, slow to modernize Duffy Supported
C4 “Ruined” the system / “zero progress” Trump, Emanuel Not supported
C4 “$80 billion DEI” instead of upgrades New York Post Not supported
C4 Launched the copper-to-fiber transition Buttigieg Partly supported
C4 Republicans blocked the $8 billion request Buttigieg’s spokesperson Unresolvable
C5 NOTAM outage shows neglect Fox opinion Partly supported
C6 Lax Boeing oversight before Alaska 1282 NTSB, OIG findings Partly supported
C7 Newark relocation caused the 2025 outages Duffy Unresolvable
C8 Paternity leave, Southwest Carlson, others Not supported (as FAA criticisms)
D1 Zero airliner crash deaths; fewer runway incidents; fewest cancellations Buttigieg Partly supported / partly supported / supported

The FAA at term end (2025-01-20)

  • Leadership. Whitaker left on Inauguration Day, 2025-01-20, after 15 months as Administrator. Chris Rocheleau, a 22-year FAA veteran, led the agency as acting Administrator from that day; President Trump formally named him acting Administrator by memo on 2025-01-30, and CBS called him the agency’s fourth acting Administrator since 2018. (Source: CBS News; DroneLife, 2025-01-30; FAA General Statements, 2024-12-12)
  • Controllers (end FY2024). 13,774 at facilities, 10,730 CPCs, 3,044 trainees and 487 Academy students; hires of 1,811 against 1,400 losses; a FY2025 goal of 2,000 already set. (Source: FAA Controller Workforce Plan 2025-2028)
  • Money. FY2025 was running on continuing resolutions; the IIJA facilities installments for FY2022 to FY2025 (about $4 billion of the $5 billion) had been appropriated, and as of 2025-09-30 about $1.8 billion of them had been obligated; the 2024 Act authorized the FAA through FY2028. (Source: FAA FY2027 Congressional Justification; FAA FY2025 Agency Financial Report; CRS IF12791)
  • Systems. 51 of 138 systems unsustainable and 17 “especially concerning”; FENS transition under way; legacy NOTAM still in service. (Source: GAO-24-107001, 2024-09-23; GAO-25-107917, 2024-12-12)
  • Boeing. The production cap and enhanced oversight were in place, with 16 OIG recommendations open for action. (Source: DOT OIG AV2025002, 2024-10-09; FAA General Statements, 2024-12-05)
  • Safety. FY2024 ended with 9 serious runway incursions and 679 losses of separation at en route centers. Five of the Safety Review Team’s 24 recommendations had been implemented by October 2024. (Source: DOT OIG AV2025026, 2025-03-12; FAA, Air Traffic by the Numbers FY2024)
  • Workforce. The Office of Personnel Management recorded 46,461 FAA employees in December 2024. (Source: OPM federal workforce data, FAA unit TD:TD03, retrieved 2026-11-17)
  • Nine days later. On 2025-01-29 an American Eagle jet and an Army helicopter collided near Reagan National Airport, killing 67. The NTSB later said “the conditions for this tragedy were in place long before the night of Jan. 29.” It falls in Part 3’s period. (Source: NTSB, 2026-01-27)

Team’s Take

Team’s Take: The scorecard below applies the series’ common instrument and its binding rules. The start-year is FY2020, the last full fiscal year before the term; the end-year is FY2024, the last full fiscal year in office. Leadership is rated on the share of the term with no Senate-confirmed Administrator. Budget is rated in real terms (FY2026 dollars, CPI-U). Safety and system performance use per-operation rates where they exist, because the pandemic collapsed traffic in FY2020 and FY2021. A program slip counts in the term in which it was announced or re-baselined.

Dimension Start of term End of term Rating Confidence Attribution note
1. Safety outcomes FY2020: 15 serious runway incursions (a pandemic-depressed count); commercial fatality rate 0.72 per 100M persons on board; no per-operation serious-incursion rate on the later basis FY2024: 9 serious incursions (22 in FY2023); fatality rate 0.01; all-incursion rate about 32 to 33 per million operations in FY2022-23 and “consistent over the last decade” (CNN); serious-incursion rate per operation down sharply 2023 to 2024; en route losses of separation down 33.8% FY2023 to FY2024; no fatal airliner crash found in the sources read Flat Medium Rated on per-operation and per-passenger rates, because COVID-19 cut traffic in FY2020-21 and counts across the term do not compare (rule D7a). The rate for all incursions stayed flat, and the commercial fatality rate is a very small number at both ends (0.72 and 0.01 per 100M on board, events unidentified). Within the term, serious events rose in FY2023 and fell in FY2024, offsetting each other. DOT credits the 2024 fall to its runway-safety push (the 2023 Safety Summit and new airfield surveillance; Reuters reported $100M for 12 airports in May 2023). The 2023 Safety Review Team found margins eroding, and the NTSB found the conditions for the January 2025 collision built up over years that include this term. NTSB Part 121 counts not read; near-collision reporting has no common basis
2. ATC staffing FY2020: 10,268 CPCs; 3,562 trainees; 920 hires; Academy reopening after a COVID closure FY2024: 10,730 CPCs (+4.5%; +1.4% within the term from FY2021); 3,044 trainees (-14.5%); 1,811 hires, about the FY2017 level (1,880); 3,903 CPCs below the collaborative target; overtime “historically high and increasing” (2023) Mixed High Hiring rose every year and regained its pre-pandemic level; certified controllers rose slightly, total controllers and trainees did not; the COVID training pause and the FY2021 goal of 500 were inherited; goals were capped by Academy capacity; Congress set a hiring floor in 2024; critical-facility staffing has a 2022 value only
3. Modernization delivery FY2020: 65% of major programs within cost and schedule bounds (goal 90%); legacy NOTAM in service 51 of 138 systems unsustainable (first assessed in 2023); NOTAM failure 2023-01-11; FENS awarded March 2023; NOTAM replacement not yet live Insufficient evidence Low No indicator is available on the same basis at both ends: GAO’s sustainability count has no 2020 counterpart, and the major-program measure has no FY2024 value in the sources read. The TFDM and Data Comm slips have no re-baseline date in the record, and the OIG traces part of each to COVID-19, so they are not counted against this term. The end state is poor and decades in the making (F&E near $3B a year for 15 years)
4. Certification and manufacturer oversight OIG (2021-02-23): gaps in FAA oversight of Boeing’s delegated authority; the 2020 reform law newly enacted In-term findings: FAA oversight of Boeing production “not effective” (OIG, 2024-10-09); FAA “ineffective” before the January 2024 door-plug accident (NTSB, 2025). In-term actions: production cap, audit, 90-day action plan, all 53 expert-panel recommendations accepted. Inspectors roughly flat in total (4,175 to about 4,184), non-supervisory down 4.4% FY2023-24 Mixed Medium Rated on oversight actions and findings during the term. The adverse findings cover practices that span administrations; the post-accident response is documented. The 737 MAX 8’s amended type certificate (2017-03-08) and the MAX’s return to service (2020-11-18) predate the term (see Part 1)
5. Leadership stability Senate-confirmed Administrator in office (Dickson, sworn in 2019-08-12) 573 days of 1,461 with no confirmed Administrator (39.2%, above the 30% line); two acting Administrators; five lines of business changed leaders; a confirmed Administrator at the end, who left on 2025-01-20 Declined High Dickson resigned for family reasons; the first nominee stalled in a Senate with doubts in both parties; the White House took 166 days to name a second; the Senate confirmed him 98-0, 47 days after nomination
6. Budget and funding FY2020 enacted $17,617.7M nominal = $22,584.1M real; F&E $3,903.4M real; authorization through FY2023 FY2024 enacted $20,083.3M nominal (+14.0%) = $21,320.4M real (-5.6%); F&E $3,387.8M real (-13.2%), or $4,449.4M real (+14.0%) with the IIJA’s $1B a year for facilities; reauthorized through FY2028 with no lapse; no shutdown Mixed High Real figures are FY2026 dollars, CPI-U. The annual budget lost ground to 2021-23 inflation, and Congress enacted less F&E than requested every year; the IIJA, signed in the term, added capital money, of which 46% of the facilities share was obligated by September 2025; the FY2025 $8B facilities proposal was not enacted. Congress, not DOT, sets amounts
7. System performance 2020: on-time 84.5%, cancelled 6.0% of scheduled flights (pandemic year; 2019 was 79.0% and 1.9%) 2024: on-time 78.10%, cancelled 1.4%; 2023 cancellations the lowest in over a decade; staffing-driven schedule relief in the New York area, 2023-24 Mixed High Volume shock: 2020’s rates reflect empty skies. On-time fell 6.4 points and cancellations fell 4.6 points from 2020; against 2019, on-time was 0.9 points worse and cancellations 0.5 points better. Airline failures (Southwest 2022) and traffic recovery drive much of both; NAS-attributed delay share not available
8. Oversight responsiveness No comparable count found for FY2020 or January 2021 5 of 24 Safety Review Team recommendations implemented by October 2024; all but 3 of the OIG’s 200-plus NextGen recommendations (2005-2022) closed by April 2024; 50 open GAO recommendations to the FAA (testimony of 2025-05-15, after the term) Insufficient evidence Low No start-year baseline on the same basis; most recommendations were issued during the term itself

Net assessment. On the scorecard’s own terms, no dimension improved over the term: leadership declined, safety was flat, four dimensions are mixed, and two lack the evidence to rate. The FAA ended the term with more nominal money, hiring back at its pre-pandemic level, fewer serious runway incursions and a tougher stance on Boeing. But its yearly budget had lost ground to inflation, certified controllers were barely ahead of 2021 and far below target, and the equipment problem the 2023 Safety Review Team called unsustainable was still in place. Were there net improvements? Not clearly: the term repaired pandemic damage and added capital money, much of it not yet spent, without changing the system’s core capacity.

(Analysis developed with AI assistance; reviewed by [editor name])

The Counterfactual

The Counterfactual: Two serious arguments cut against the net assessment, from opposite directions.

The first is that it is too generous. The administration had four years, a bipartisan infrastructure law and a Safety Review Team report in hand by November 2023, yet it let the top job sit empty for 573 days, saw annual FAA funding fall 5.6 percent after inflation, set hiring goals the National Academies called insufficient to make up past losses, and handed on 51 unsustainable systems, four of them critical systems with no modernization investment at all. On this view, the department that oversees the FAA owns the pace, whatever Congress appropriated, and the January 2025 collision showed what latent risk looked like.

The second is that it is too harsh. The term opened with the Academy just reopened from a pandemic closure and a hiring goal of 500, and hiring then rose every year back to its pre-pandemic level. The equipment problem is decades old, Congress held the capital account near $3 billion and enacted less than requested each year, the IIJA facilities money the administration signed into law raised real capital funding by 14 percent but could not buy radars or automation, and the pandemic distorts every start-year comparison. No source read reports a fatal U.S. airliner crash during the term, serious runway incursions fell to 9 in FY2024, and the leadership vacancy ended in a 98-0 confirmation. On this view, the term turned several trends around, and the remaining problems would need more money and more time than any one administration had.

Both arguments rest on documented facts. They differ on how much a Secretary and an administration can change in four years, which the record cannot settle.

Connections

Connections:

→ This article is Part 2 of a three-part series. Part 1: The FAA ended Trump’s first term with fewer certified controllers. Part 3: The FAA under Trump was mid-rebuild when a router problem halted US flights. Master chronology: The FAA, 2016–2026: A Timeline. → Federal Aviation Administration → Agency Damage Assessment → Federal Aviation Administration — Agency Damage Assessment (Source: Citizen Analyst knowledge base, draft) → Pete Buttigieg → Secretary of Transportation, 2021-2025 → Pete Buttigieg — Secretary of Transportation (Biden Fitness Voucher) → Sean Duffy → successor Secretary, author of criticisms C2, C4 and C7 → Sean Duffy – Secretary of Transportation → Ted Cruz → opposed the Washington nomination (C1) → Ted Cruz — U.S. Senator (Texas) → Sam Graves → House T&I chair; co-signed the 2023-03-02 letter; sponsor of the 2024 Act → Sam Graves — U.S. Representative (MO-6), Transportation Committee Chair → Elon Musk → called for Whitaker’s resignation in September 2024 → Elon Musk — Political Accountability Profile → Donald Trump → made the 2025 diversity-hiring claim (C3) and the 2026 “ruined the system” claim (C4) → Donald Trump — 45th and 47th President of the United States → Bryan Bedford → FAA Administrator, confirmed 2025-07-09 and in office from 2025-07-10 (Part 3) → bryan-bedford-profile

(AI-surfaced, human verification required before publication)

Civic Action

Civic Action:

→ Verify the staffing numbers yourself. The FAA publishes its annual Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan on faa.gov; the tables above come from those plans’ appendices. → Check open recommendations. GAO’s website lists each report’s recommendations and whether the FAA has implemented them (search for GAO-24-107001 or GAO-26-107320). The DOT Inspector General’s recommendation dashboard at oig.dot.gov does the same for its audits, including the pending audit of the Newark relocation. → Read the safety data. Runway incursion counts are in the FAA’s runway safety statistics and in DOT OIG report AV2025026; airline on-time and cancellation rates are in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ monthly Air Travel Consumer Report. → Follow the oversight. The Senate Commerce Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hold FAA hearings; transcripts and witness statements are posted on congress.gov and govinfo.gov. NTSB dockets for the Austin, Alaska 1282 and Potomac investigations are public at ntsb.gov. → Ask for records. The FAA accepts Freedom of Information Act requests; the 2023 Academy referral-tier presentation at the center of claim C3 has not been published.

Evidence Trail

→ Primary source: GAO-24-107001, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, 2024-09-23 → Primary source: FAA, National Airspace System Safety Review Team: Discussion and Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace System, 2023-11-15 → Primary source: FAA Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plans, 2022-2031 through 2026-2028 (appendix tables) → Citizen Analyst Knowledge Base: Federal Aviation Administration — Agency Damage Assessment, the FAA Agency Damage Assessment, which carries the 2025-2026 record → External verification: DOT OIG AV2025026 (runway incursions, 2025-03-12) and BTS Air Travel Consumer Reports

Sources

Every source below is cited in the text. Dates are publication dates; where the source does not carry one, the entry says so. Research for this article was drawn from the series research files (docs/faa-series-2026-11/research/, waves r1 to r7 and g1 to g3) and three searches on 2026-11-17.

Government: FAA and DOT

  1. FAA. Historical Chronology 2013-2021. [publication date not available; file posted January 2022]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-01/2013_2021_chronology.pdf
  2. FAA. 2022-April 2024 Update to FAA Historical Chronology. [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/about/history/chronology-2022-2024
  3. FAA. National Airspace System Safety Review Team: Discussion and Recommendations To Address Risk in the National Airspace System. 2023-11-15. https://www.faa.gov/NAS_safety_review_team_report.pdf
  4. FAA. “FAA Takes Actions to Address Independent Safety Review Team’s Recommendations.” 2023-11-17. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-takes-actions-address-independent-safety-review-teams-recommendations
  5. FAA. The Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2022-2031. [publication date not available]. https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23991593/2022-afn-cwp.pdf
  6. FAA. Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan FY2024 (2024-2033). [publication date not available; file name dated 2024-05-09]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/afn-aba-20240509-cwp-congress.pdf
  7. FAA. Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2025-2028. 2025-08-21 (page posting date). https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/fy25-air-traffic-controller-workforce-plan_0.pdf
  8. FAA. Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan 2026-2028. [May or June 2026; sources disagree on the date]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/Air-Traffic-Controller-Workforce-Plan-2026-2028_0.pdf
  9. FAA. “FAA Hits Air Traffic Controller Hiring Goal.” 2024-09-23. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-hits-air-traffic-controller-hiring-goal
  10. FAA. “2025 Budget Proposal Invests in Aviation Safety.” 2024-03-11. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/2025-budget-proposal-invests-aviation-safety
  11. DOT. FY 2025 President’s Budget Submission, Federal Aviation Administration. [publication date not available; March 2024]. https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2024-03/FAA_FY_2025_Budget_Budget_Request.pdf
  12. DOT. FAA FY 2026 Budget Estimates (Congressional Justification). [publication date not available; May 2025]. https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2025-05/FAA_FY_2026_Budget_Estimates_CJ.pdf
  13. DOT. FAA FY 2027 Budget Estimates (Congressional Justification), Ten-Year Tables and Capital Investment Plan. 2026-04-03. https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/FAA_FY_2027_Budget_Estimates_CJ.pdf
  14. FAA. FY2025 Agency Financial Report. [publication date not available; fiscal year ended 2025-09-30]. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/afn/offices/finance/offices/financial_management/ar/fy25-faa-agency-financial-report.pdf
  15. FAA. FY2020 Summary of Performance and Financial Information. [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/plans_reports/2020-FAA-PAR-Summary.pdf
  16. FAA. FY2019 Performance and Accountability Report. [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/afn/offices/finance/offices/budget/par/fy19-par.pdf
  17. FAA. FY2024 Performance and Accountability Report. [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/afn/offices/finance/offices/budget/par/fy24-par-spfi.pdf
  18. FAA Air Traffic Organization. Air Traffic by the Numbers FY2024. [publication date not available; data dated 2025-04-30]. https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers/air-traffic-by-the-numbers-FY2024.pdf
  19. FAA. Runway Incursion Totals, regional pages, FY2019 to FY2021. [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/statistics/regional/index.cfm?fy=2021
  20. FAA. “FAA NOTAM Statement.” Entries of 2023-01-11 and 2023-01-19. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-notam-statement
  21. DOT. Testimony of acting Administrator Billy Nolen, “The Federal Aviation Administration’s NOTAM System Failure and Its Impacts,” Senate Commerce Committee. 2023-02-15. https://www.transportation.gov/federal-aviation-administrations-notam-system-failure-and-its-impacts-resilient-national-airspace ; and FAA, Statement of Timothy L. Arel, chief operating officer, Air Traffic Organization, Senate Commerce aviation subcommittee [publication date not available; 2023], https://faa.gov/testimony/statement-timothy-l-arel-chief-operating-officer-air-traffic-organization-hearing-united
  22. FAA. “What is a NOTAM?” and “U.S. Transportation Secretary Duffy Deploys Brand New ‘Notice to Airmen’ System.” [publication date not available; September 2025]. https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/notam/what_is_a_notam
  23. FAA. “5G and Aviation Safety.” [publication date not available]. https://www.faa.gov/5g
  24. FAA. “Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft.” [running page; entries 2024-01-06 to 2024-12-05]. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/updates-boeing-737-9-max-aircraft
  25. FAA. “FAA Halts Boeing MAX Production Expansion to Improve Quality Control.” 2024-01-24. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-halts-boeing-max-production-expansion-improve-quality-control-also-lays-out-extensive
  26. FAA. “Review Panel’s Final Report on Organization Designation Authorizations (ODA) for the Design and Production of Airplanes.” Entries of 2024-02-26 and 2024-09-05. https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/review-panels-final-report-organization-designation-authorizations-oda-design-and
  27. FAA. General Statements (2024 entries on serious runway incursion rates, and entries of 2024-12-05 and 2024-12-12). https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements/general-statements
  28. FAA. Aviation Safety Workforce Plans 2021-2030, FY2024 and FY2025. [publication dates not available]. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/plans_reports/wfp_2021.pdf ; https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/afn-aba-20240510-avs-wp-congress.pdf ; https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/fy25-aviation-safety-workforce-plan.pdf
  29. FAA. Testimony of Administrator Michael Whitaker, House T&I Aviation Subcommittee. 2024-02-06. https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116719/witnesses/HHRG-118-PW05-Wstate-WhitakerM-20240206.pdf
  30. DOT. “U.S. Department of Transportation Accomplishments Overview, January 2021-January 2025.” [publication date not available; January 2025]. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-accomplishments-overview-january-2021-january-2025
  31. DOT. “DOT Penalizes Southwest Airlines $140 Million for 2022 Holiday Meltdown.” 2023-12-18. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot-penalizes-southwest-airlines-140-million-2022-holiday-meltdown
  32. DOT. Secretary Buttigieg remarks announcing airline consumer protection rules. 2024-04-24. https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/secretary-buttigieg-delivers-remarks-washington-national-airport-announce-major
  33. DOT and FAA. Brand New Air Traffic Control System Plan. [publication date not available; May 2025]. https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2025-05/Brand%20New%20Air%20Traffic%20Control%20System%20Plan.pdf
  34. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Air Travel Consumer Report, December 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 (full-year editions). [publication dates not available]. https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/air-travel-consumer-report-december-2023-full-year-2023-numbers (same pattern for each year)
  35. Federal Register. Airport Terminal Program notices of funding opportunity. 2022-02-25, 2022-09-28 and 2023-09-14. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/02/25/2022-03998/notice-of-funding-opportunity
  36. Office of Personnel Management. Federal workforce data, FAA (unit TD:TD03), snapshot December 2024. Retrieved 2026-11-17. https://data.opm.gov/get-data/api-access

Government: oversight bodies and Congress

  1. DOT OIG. AV2021020, Weaknesses in FAA’s Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the 737 MAX 8. 2021-02-23. http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38302
  2. DOT OIG. Report titles listed on the OIG site: “NextGen Benefits Have Not Kept Pace With Initial Projections” (2021-03-30) and the NAS Voice System contract termination (2022-01-12), https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46878 ; and DOT OIG, FAA NextGen External Factors, 2025-07-23 (Data Comm delay and cost attributed to COVID-19 and shutdowns), https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/library-items/FAA%20NextGen%20External%20Factors%20Final%20Report_7-23-25.pdf
  3. DOT OIG. “FAA Has Taken Steps To Validate Its Air Traffic Skills Assessment Test but Lacks a Plan To Evaluate Its Effectiveness” (title and date only). 2023-01-11. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/47116
  4. DOT OIG. AV2023025, FAA Has Completed 737 MAX Return to Service Efforts. 2023-04-26. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Return%20to%20Service%20Final%20Report%5E4.26.2023_revised.pdf
  5. DOT OIG. AV2023035, FAA Faces Controller Staffing Challenges as Air Traffic Operations Return to Pre-Pandemic Levels at Critical Facilities. 2023-06-21. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39530
  6. DOT OIG. FY2024 Top Management Challenges. 2023-11-01. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Top%20Management%20Challenges%20for%20DOT%20FY%202024%20Final%20Report%20%2811.1.23%29_signed_508.pdf
  7. DOT OIG. AV2024023, FAA’s Report on Air Traffic Modernization Presents an Incomplete and Out-of-Date Assessment of NextGen. 2024-04-30. http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46255
  8. DOT OIG. AV2024031, FAA Has Begun To Deploy TFDM, but Cost Growth Has Resulted in Significant Program Changes and Delayed Benefits. 2024-07-17. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46321
  9. DOT OIG. AV2025002, FAA’s Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective. 2024-10-09. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46466
  10. DOT OIG. AV2025026, FAA Has Taken Steps To Prevent and Mitigate Runway Incursions. 2025-03-12. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/library-items/FAA%20Runway%20Incursions%20Final%20Report_3.12.25.pdf
  11. DOT OIG. “Audit Initiated of FAA’s Relocation of Newark-Area TRACON Responsibilities.” 2025-07-28. https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/46879
  12. DOT OIG. Report of Investigation I15E012SINV, FAA 2014 Air Traffic Controller Hiring Practices. Dated 2016-08-09; posted May 2025. https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/OIG%20Report%20of%20Investigation%20-%20FAA%202014%20Air%20Traffic%20Controller%20Hiring%20Practices_0.pdf
  13. GAO. GAO-22-104480, Aircraft Certification: Comparison of U.S. and European Processes. 2022-06-30. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104480
  14. GAO. GAO-24-105254, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Program Management Improvements Could Help FAA Address NextGen Delays and Challenges. 2023-11-09. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105254
  15. GAO. GAO-24-107001, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems. 2024-09-23. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107001
  16. GAO. GAO-25-107917 (testimony). 2024-12-12. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107917
  17. GAO. GAO-25-108502 (testimony). 2025-05-15 (the series research also records an unconfirmed February 2025 date). https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-108502/index.html
  18. GAO. GAO-25-108054, priority open recommendations to DOT (June 2025 letter, counting June 2024). [June 2025; day not available]. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108054
  19. GAO. GAO-26-107320, Air Traffic Control Workforce: FAA Should Establish Goals and Better Assess Its Hiring Processes. 2025-12-17. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107320/index.html
  20. NTSB. Austin runway incursion, DCA23FA149, board meeting and release. 2024-06-06. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA23FA149.aspx
  21. NTSB. “Boeing’s Inadequate ‘Training, Guidance and Oversight’ Led to Mid-Exit Door Plug Blowout” (NR20250624). 2025-06-24. https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20250624.aspx
  22. NTSB. “Systemic Failures Led to Midair Collision Over Potomac River” (NR20260127). 2026-01-27. https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20260127.aspx
  23. NTSB. Midair Collision over the Potomac River, AIR-26-02. 2026-02-17. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AIR2602.pdf
  24. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (Transportation Research Board). The Air Traffic Controller Workforce Imperative, chapter 2. 2025-06-18. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/29112/chapter/4
  25. CRS. IF12791, The 2024 FAA Reauthorization. 2024-10-23. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF12791.html
  26. CRS. R49491, Federal Government Shutdowns and the Impact on Civil Aviation. 2026-10-22. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R49491
  27. GovInfo. P.L. 118-15 (2023-09-30) and P.L. 118-34 (2023-12-26). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-118publ15/html/PLAW-118publ15.htm ; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-118publ34/html/PLAW-118publ34.htm
  28. Congress.gov. H.R. 3935, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, text (section 437). Enacted 2024-05-16. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/3935/text ; and the House committee hearing memo that records the final Senate (88-4, 2024-05-09) and House (387-26, 2024-05-15) votes [publication date not available; 2025]: https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73747/text
  29. Congress.gov. PN9, nomination of Phillip A. Washington (118th Congress). Received 2023-01-03; withdrawn 2023-03-30. https://www.congress.gov/nomination/118th-congress/9
  30. U.S. Senate. Roll call vote 263, 118th Congress, 1st session (Whitaker confirmation), 2023-10-24, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1181/vote_118_1_00263.htm ; and roll call vote 11, 117th Congress, 1st session (Buttigieg confirmation, 86-13), 2021-02-02, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00011.htm
  31. House T&I Committee. Hearing memo, “The State of American Aviation and the Federal Aviation Administration.” 2024-02-06. https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73208/text
  32. House T&I Committee. Letter from Chair Sam Graves and Sen. Ted Cruz to President Biden. 2023-03-02. https://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2023-03-02_graves_cruz_letter_re_phil_washington.pdf
  33. GovInfo. S. Hrg. 118-730, FAA Oversight of Aviation Manufacturing. Hearing 2024-06-13. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-118shrg61869/html/CHRG-118shrg61869.htm
  34. House T&I Democrats. Subcommittee hearing, “Implementation of Boeing’s Comprehensive Action Plan.” 2024-09-24. https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/subcommittee-hearing-on-implementation-of-boeings-comprehensive-action-plan
  35. House T&I Democrats. “Ranking Members Larsen, Cohen Statements from Hearing on the State of American Aviation with FAA Administrator.” [publication date not available; 2024]. https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/ranking-members-larsen-cohen-statements-from-hearing-on-the-state-of-american-aviation-with-faa-administrator
  36. Senate Commerce Committee. Transcript of Sen. Cantwell’s remarks, aviation subcommittee hearing. 2024-12-12. https://www.commerce.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/media/doc/12.12.24%20Transcript%20Cantwell%20Aviation%20Hearing.pdf

News, fact-checks and statements

  1. Politico. “FAA Administrator Steve Dickson stepping down.” 2022-02-16. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/16/faa-administrator-steve-dickson-stepping-down-00009698
  2. CNBC. “FAA chief Steve Dickson announces resignation midway through term.” 2022-02-17. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/17/faa-chief-steve-dickson-announces-resignation-midway-through-term.html
  3. CNBC. “AT&T, Verizon CEOs reject U.S. request for 5G deployment delay.” 2022-01-03. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/03/att-verizon-ceos-reject-us-request-for-5g-deployment-delay.html
  4. CNBC. “Major U.S. airline CEOs warn 5G could ground some planes.” 2022-01-17. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/17/major-us-airline-ceos-warn-5g-could-ground-some-planes-wreak-havoc-.html
  5. NPR. “FAA NOTAM system outage may have been caused by damaged file” (quoting Buttigieg’s statement). 2023-01-11. https://www.npr.org/2023/01/11/1148340708/faa-notam-ground-stop-flight-delay
  6. The Hill. “FAA identifies contractor involved in outage that cause nationwide ground stop.” [publication date not available; January 2023]. https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/3833194-faa-identifies-contractor-involved-in-outage-that-cause-nationwide-ground-stop
  7. Business Insider. Two articles: “FedEx Aircraft Aborted Landing to Avoid Southwest Airlines Jet in Austin” [publication date not available; February 2023], https://www.businessinsider.com/fedex-aircraft-almost-collided-southwest-airlines-jet-austin-2023-2 ; and its report on airline close calls and the record since 2009 [publication date not available; August 2023], https://www.businessinsider.com/airline-close-calls-happening-multiple-times-nyt-investigation-2023-8
  8. CNN. “Buttigieg cites ‘uptick’ in aviation incidents at FAA safety summit.” 2023-03-15. https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/15/us/faa-air-safety-summit-close-calls
  9. CNBC (Reuters). “FAA to boost US air traffic control safety after close calls.” 2023-03-23. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/23/faa-to-boost-us-air-traffic-control-safety-after-close-calls.html
  10. Reuters (David Shepardson) via Yahoo Finance. “More tech investment needed to prevent aviation accidents – US safety board.” 2023-05-24. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-safety-board-seeks-answers-101409479.html
  11. Washington Technology. “FAA selects Verizon for $2.4B telecommunications contract.” [publication date not available; March 2023]. https://www.washingtontechnology.com/companies/2023/03/faa-selects-verizon-24b-telecommunications-contract/384517
  12. Verizon Public Sector release (via Stock Titan). FAA Enterprise Network Services award. 2023-03-31. https://www.stocktitan.net/news/VZ/verizon-public-sector-wins-federal-aviation-administration-atyw8sjfqo30.html ; SAM.gov notice: https://sam.gov/opp/7e58b8f050ef40f59761aa3b334528a5/view
  13. Eno Center for Transportation. “Phil Washington Withdraws Name from FAA Nomination.” 2023-03-26 (updated 2023-03-31). https://enotrans.org/article/phil-washington-withdraws-name-from-faa-nomination
  14. Politico. “Biden’s FAA nominee bows out, after senators waver.” 2023-03-26. https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/26/biden-faa-nominee-withdrew-00088847
  15. Politico. “White House officially nominates new FAA chief.” 2023-09-07. https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/07/white-house-nominates-whitaker-to-lead-faa-00114451
  16. NBC News. “Senate confirms Michael Whitaker to run the Federal Aviation Administration.” 2023-10-24. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-confirms-michael-whitaker-run-federal-aviation-administration-rcna122033
  17. Government Executive. “Overtime, staffing shortages and shutdowns to blame for recent air safety issues, panel finds.” 2023-11-15. https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2023/11/overtime-staffing-shortages-and-shutdowns-blame-recent-air-safety-issues-panel-finds/392051
  18. AP via Yahoo Finance. “Southwest Airlines reaches $140 million settlement.” 2023-12-18. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/southwest-airlines-reaches-140-million-100105692.html
  19. CNBC. “FAA audit of Boeing’s 737 Max production found ‘dozens of issues’: NYT.” 2024-03-12. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/12/faa-audit-of-boeings-737-max-production-found-dozens-of-issues-nyt.html
  20. CNBC. “Biden wants to hire 2,000 air traffic controllers in 2025.” 2024-03-11. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/11/biden-wants-to-hire-2000-air-traffic-controllers-in-2025.html
  21. Reuters via Yahoo Finance. “Biden wants to hire 2,000 air traffic controllers.” 2024-03-11. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1-biden-wants-hire-2-183243226.html
  22. Reuters via Yahoo Finance. “US FAA relocating control of Newark, NJ, airspace to reduce congestion.” 2024-03-20. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1-us-faa-relocating-control-224027181.html
  23. CNBC. “FAA will require more rest time for air traffic controllers.” 2024-04-19. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/04/19/faa-will-require-more-rest-time-for-air-traffic-controllers.html
  24. CNBC. “FAA to strengthen oversight as Boeing set to resume 737 MAX production.” 2024-11-07. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/11/07/faa-to-strengthen-oversight-as-boeing-set-to-resume-737-max-production.html
  25. CNBC. “Federal Aviation Administration head Michael Whitaker to step down.” 2024-12-12. https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2024/12/12/federal-aviation-administration-head-michael-whitaker-to-step-down-jan-20.html
  26. CBS News. “Trump appoints new FAA administrator after vacancy during deadly plane crash.” [publication date not available; late January 2025]. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/plane-crash-dc-faa-administrator-trump-appointment ; with DroneLife, “Chris Rocheleau Appointed as Acting FAA Administrator,” 2025-01-30, https://dronelife.com/2025/01/30/chris-rocheleau-appointed-as-acting-faa-administrator
  27. NBC News. “Trump implies DEI could be to blame” for the Potomac collision. 2025-01-30. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/trump-plane-crash-dei-press-conference-biden-faa-washington-dc-rcna190020
  28. Mother Jones. “Trump Responds to Washington Plane Crash.” [publication date not available; January 2025]. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2025/01/trump-dc-plane-crash-dei-conspiracy
  29. CNBC. “Plane crash: Trump blames DEI, Biden” (Buttigieg’s response). 2025-01-30. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/01/30/trump-lashes-out-at-biden-dei-efforts-after-dc-plane-crash.html
  30. BBC Verify. “Fact-checking Trump’s claims” on FAA hiring. 2025-01-31. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyeg61pnl5o
  31. FactCheck.org. “No Evidence for the Political Finger-Pointing Over D.C. Plane Crash.” 2025-01-31. https://www.factcheck.org/2025/01/no-evidence-for-the-political-finger-pointing-over-d-c-plane-crash
  32. New York Times. “Before Crash, an Alarming Pattern of Near-Misses Between Planes.” 2025-01-31. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/us/plane-crash-near-misses-airlines.html
  33. Fox News. “Duffy blasts Buttigieg, accusing Biden-era official of mismanagement.” 2025-02-18. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/duffy-blasts-buttigieg-accusing-biden-era-official-mismanagement-mayor-pete-failed-four-years.print
  34. Fox News. “Sean Duffy claims Democrats ignored report about FAA.” 2025-05-06. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/duffy-blasts-biden-buttigieg-ignoring-report-failing-air-traffic-control-system-did-nothing
  35. Sean Duffy on X. Post on Newark. [May 2025; day not captured]. https://x.com/SecDuffy/status/1921998476344275382
  36. CNBC. “Newark airport air traffic controllers lost contact” (radar outage). 2025-05-09. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/09/newark-airport-air-traffic-controllers-radar-outage-planes.html
  37. CNN. “Are plane close calls and crashes actually increasing?” [publication date not available; May 2025]. https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2025/05/us/plane-crashes-incidents-data-visuals-dg
  38. CNBC. “U.S. proposes to extend Newark airport flight cuts through October 2026.” 2025-08-08. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/08/us-proposes-to-extend-newark-airport-flight-cuts-through-october-2026.html
  39. Reason Foundation. “Newark air traffic control shifted to Philadelphia TRACON” [publication date not available], https://reason.org/aviation-policy-news/newark-air-traffic-control-shifted-to-philadelphia-tracon ; and “FAA safety review reveals air traffic control dysfunction” (quoting the Safety Review Team) [publication date not available; late 2023], https://reason.org/aviation-policy-news/faa-safety-review-reveals-air-traffic-control-dysfunction
  40. Snopes. “Unraveling claim Pete Buttigieg’s DOT spent $80B on ‘DEI’.” 2025-08-09. https://www.snopes.com/news/2025/08/09/air-traffic-control-dei-buttigieg
  41. New York Post. “Sean Duffy blasts predecessor Pete Buttigieg for changing FAA Academy exam tiers.” 2025-08-13. https://nypost.com/2025/08/13/us-news/dot-chief-sean-duffy-charges-predecessor-pete-buttgieig-lowered-standards-for-air-traffic-controllers-in-bombshell-claim-during-pod-force-one-appearance
  42. Fox News. “Trump admin accuses Buttigieg of ‘juicing’ numbers.” 2025-08-20. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/duffys-dot-accuses-biden-buttigieg-inflating-air-traffic-controller-pipeline-juiced-numbers
  43. FedScoop. “As DOGE enters FAA, an aging aviation safety system may come into focus.” [publication date not available; 2025]. https://fedscoop.com/faa-aviation-safety-system-doge-notam
  44. Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, case summary of Brigida v. United States Department of Transportation [publication date not available], https://clearinghouse.net/case/45988 ; CourtListener docket 1:16-cv-02227 (D.D.C., opened 2016-11-07), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/4542755/brigida-v-united-states-department-of-transportation/
  45. Business Insider. “Buttigieg pushes back at Tucker Carlson mocking paternity leave.” [publication date not available; October 2021]. https://www.businessinsider.com/pete-buttigieg-tucker-carlson-mocking-paternity-leave-transportation-2021-10
  46. TheWrap. “Pete Buttigieg Pushes Back at Suggestion He’s Responsible” (quoting C-SPAN and Duffy). 2026-11-13. https://www.thewrap.com/media-platforms/politics/pete-buttigieg-responds-faa-ground-stop-blame
  47. NOTUS. “Duffy Blames Federal Contractor for Friday’s Abrupt Ground Stop.” 2026-11-14. https://www.notus.org/agencies/faa-flight-disruption-impacts-resolved-by-sunday-sean-duffy
  48. Pete Buttigieg on X. Statement on the ground stop. 2026-11-16. https://x.com/PeteButtigieg/status/2122401936720695318
  49. The Hill. Buttigieg and Trump on the FAA ground stop. 2026-11-16. https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/6223723-buttigieg-trump-faa-groundstop
  50. Newsweek. “Buttigieg Defends Biden-Era Aviation After Trump Blames Him for FAA Outage.” [publication date not available; November 2026]. https://www.newsweek.com/buttigieg-defends-biden-era-aviation-after-trump-blames-him-for-faa-outage-12723405
  51. Fox News (opinion, Liz Peek). “Buttigieg’s cheap shots at Duffy over ground stop.” 2026-11-17. https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/buttigieg-trashes-duffys-ground-stop-response-dot-failures-doom-2028-bid

Initial research and drafting assisted by AI; all facts independently verified by [editor name].

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